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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Trust Code ("UTC")1 includes a number of provisions
dealing with the rights of creditors to reach the interests of trust bene-
1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
approved the "Final Act 2000" version of the UTC in August 2000 and, after sev-
eral amendments to the Final Act 2000, approved the "Final Act 2005" dated
March 7, 2005. The current UTC with Prefatory Note and Comments is available
online, see UNIFORM TRUST CODE, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll
archives/ulc/uta/2005final.pdf.
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ficiaries. 2 A few authors3 in a series of articles 4 have raised concerns
that adopting the UTC significantly undermines traditional equity
rules and policies governing the protection of trust assets against
claims of creditors. These articles have caused attorneys and other
trust professionals to question the extent to which enactment of the
UTC changes the rules in this important area of trust law. The argu-
ments raised by these few authors provided the initial impetus for this
article. To address the particular concerns of Nebraska attorneys, we
extensively analyzed Nebraska law governing the protection of trust
assets against claims of creditors prior to enactment of the Nebraska
Uniform Trust Code ("Nebraska UTC")5 which became operative on
January 1, 2005. The comprehensive legislative study prior to enact-
ment concluded that the Nebraska UTC would change prior case law
on these types of trusts very little and that the changes made by the
Nebraska UTC were grounded in sound legislative policy.6 We then
2. See, e.g., UTC Sections 501 (Rights of Beneficiary's Creditor or Assignee), 502
(Spendthrift Provision), 503 (Exceptions To Spendthrift Provision), 504 (Discre-
tionary Trusts; Effect of Standard), 505 (Creditor's Claim Against Settlor), and
506 (Overdue Distribution).
3. Mark Merrick, Stephen J. Oshins, and Douglas W. Stein are the most published
authors.
4. See, e.g., Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on the Asset Protec-
tion of Spendthrift Trusts, 31 ESTATE PLANNING 375 (2004); Mark Merric &
Steven J. Oshins, UTC May Reduce the Asset Protection of Non-Self-Settled
Trusts, 31 ESTATE PLANNING 411 (2004); Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, How
Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be Affected by the UTC? 31 ESTATE
PLANNING 478 (2004); Mark Merric & Douglas W. Stein, A Threat to All SNTs,
TRUSTS & ESTATES 38 (November 2004) (arguing that adoption of the UTC gives
"state and federal agencies . . . a greater ability to deny government benefits
when families have created trusts to supplement the care of their elderly or dis-
abled-unless the governing documents contain 'special needs' language"); and
Mark Merric, Robert D. Gillen & Jane Freeman, Malpractice Issues and the Uni-
form Trust Code, 31 ESTATE PLANNING 586 (2004); Interview by Commerce Clear-
ing House with Mark Merric, manager, Merric Law Firm, LLC, & Douglas Stein,
partner, Barris, Sott, Denn and Driker, PLLC, The UTC: A Continuing Threat To
Estate Planning, 31 ESTATE PLANNING REVIEW No. 1 (2005).
5. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3801 to 30-38,110 (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B.
124, §§ 22 to 28, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
6. See Comments and Recommendations For Enactment of a Nebraska Uniform
Trust Code, L.R. 367, Article 5, 145-67 (December 2002). For other analysis of
the Nebraska enactment, see Ronald R. Volkmer, The Nebraska Uniform Trust
Code: Nebraska Trust Law in Transition, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 73-79 (2003):
From the perspective of the author, the rules under Article 5 of the Ne-
braska UTC provide the needed clarity currently lacking in the case law.
The changes wrought by Article 5 are likely to be the subject of contin-
ued debate, but at least there is a statutory framework for analysis that
will take the Nebraska law beyond the murky depths of the Smith, Dok-
sansky, and Summers trilogy.
Id. at 79. See also William J. Lindsay, Jr., The Nebraska Uniform Trust Code
from the Trenches: A Practitioner's Guide to Understanding Nebraska's Neu, Uni-
form Trust Code, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93, 131-34 (2003).
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compared the Nebraska UTC provisions relating to this area with
prior Nebraska law. Finally, we examined the arguments presented
in the various articles. We concluded that, although the Nebraska
UTC expanded the rights of certain specific creditors under limited
circumstances, 7 there was no basis for the prophesies of doom as-
serted by these authors. Similar conclusions have been reached na-
tionally and in other states enacting the UTC.8
As we prepared the initial draft, we realized that our analysis sug-
gested a broader policy inquiry-a more extensive examination of the
relationships between and among a settlor's powers to preclude or
limit the claims of creditors against trust property, a beneficiary's in-
terest in a trust, the discretionary authority of a trustee, and the
rights of the beneficiary's creditors in and to the beneficiary's interest
in the trust. The Nebraska Supreme Court's 2006 decision in
Pohlmann v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services9
helped crystalize our thinking about those relationships and also
greatly clarified both the pre and post-UTC Nebraska trust law. The
2007 Nebraska Legislature further clarified the Nebraska statues by
enacting revisions to the 2000 original text of the Uniform Trust Code
made by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 2005.10 Although this article addresses the arguments of the
7. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3848(b) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (allowing, notwith-
standing a spendthrift provision, "a beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse
who has a judgment or court order against a beneficiary for support or mainte-
nance, or a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection of a
beneficiary's interest in the trust" to obtain a court order attaching present or fu-
ture distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary) (emphasis added). Note
that the 2004 Nebraska Legislature amended the Nebraska UTC to make these
exceptions applicable only to trusts that became irrevocable on or after January
1, 2005. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3848(b), 30-3849(c), 30-38,110(d) (Cum. Supp.
2006). See John M. Gradwohl and William H. Lyons, Constitutional and Other
Issues in the Application of the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code to Preexisting
Trusts, 82 NEB. L. REV. 312, 343-45 (2003) (recommending adoption of these
amendments to avoid possible constitutional objections relating to retroactive
legislation).
8. See Robert T. Danforth, Article Five of the UTC and the Future of Creditors'
Rights in Trusts, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 2551(2006), Alan Newman, Spendthrift and
Discretionary Trusts: Alive and Well Under The Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 567 (2005), Stanley C. Kent & Richard E. Davis, The Uni-
form Trust Code and Supplemental Needs Trusts, 15 PROBATE L.J. OF OHIO 53
(2005), and Suzanne Brown Walsh, Richard E. Davis, Stanley C. Kent & Alan
Newman, What Is the Status of Creditors Under the Uniform Trust Code?, 32 EST.
PLAN. 29 (2005). Cf. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, In Search of a Unifying Principle For
Article V of the Uniform Trust Code: A Response To Professor Danforth, 27 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2609 (2006).
9. 271 Neb. 272, 710 N.W.2d 639 (2006).
10. L.B. 124, §§ 22 to 28 (2007), supra note 5. Legislative history relating to these
sections of L.B. 124 can be found associated with L.B. 114 (2007) which was incor-
porated into L.B. 124 by the Banking, Commerce, and Insurance Committee. The
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authors mentioned earlier, its principal purpose is to provide a frame-
work for analysis of the broader issues under the Nebraska UTC.
II. NEBRASKA LAW PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF THE
NEBRASKA UTC
The Nebraska Supreme Court has long recognized various trust ar-
rangements that, to a greater or lesser extent, protect the interests of
a beneficiary (other than the settlor") from claims of the beneficiary's
creditors. These trust arrangements include the "discretionary
trust,"12 the "support trust,"1 3 the hybrid "discretionary support
trust,"14 and the "spendthrift trust."15 In addition to these trust ar-
rangements, the "special needs trust" (sometimes called a "supple-
mental needs trust") may offer a measure of asset protection. 16 The
primary purpose of the "special needs/supplemental needs trust" is not
only to provide a disabled beneficiary benefits over and above those
provided by Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") but
also to avoid disqualifying the beneficiary from receiving Medicaid
and SSI benefits.
A. Discretionary Trusts
In terms of a beneficiary's right to distributions from a trust, trusts
have traditionally been classified as either "mandatory" or "discretion-
ary." This terminology has now been codified in the Nebraska UTC.17
If the trustee is required to distribute income, principal, or both to a
beneficiary, the trust is a mandatory trust.' 8 If the settlor gives the
trustee discretion concerning the distribution, the trust is a discretion-
ary trust.19 This seemingly clear distinction blurs when a settlor uses
language such as "my trustee shall, in its absolute discretion, dis-
tribute such amounts as are necessary for my daughter's support."
original text of the UTC was drafted in 2000, and revisions by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were made in 2005.
11. Neither prior Nebraska law nor the Nebraska UTC allows a settlor to shield his
own retained interest in a trust from creditors. See First National Bank v. First
Cadco Corp. 189 Neb. 734, 205 N.W.2d 115 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3850
(Cum. Supp. 2006).
12. See discussion infra section II.A.
13. See Byron Reed Co. v. Klabunde, 76 Neb. 801, 108 N.W. 133 (1906) and discus-
sion infra section II.B.
14. See Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A., 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104
(2000) and other cases discussed infra section II.C.
15. See Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899) and other cases dis-
cussed infra section II.D.2.
16. See discussion infra section II.E.
17. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3851 (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B. 124, § 26,
100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
18. Id.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §50(1); § 50 Cmt. a (2003).
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1. "Discretion"-In general
The amount of discretion accorded to a trustee depends, in the first
instance, on the settlor's language in the trust instrument. The grant
of discretion may take many forms. For example, the trustee may
have discretion to decide whether to pay income or accumulate it and
add it to principal. The trustee may have discretion to decide which
individuals from a particular group or class will receive distributions.
Often, the trustee must exercise the discretion under a standard. For
example, a settlor may direct that the trustee make payments only for
the education of a beneficiary, or that a trustee may invade corpus
only in the event of an emergency, disability or hardship affecting a
beneficiary.
When a settlor grants a trustee discretion, that grant affects a ben-
eficiary's right to compel a trustee to provide a benefit because the
grant of discretion limits judicial review of the trustee's exercise (or
non-exercise) of the discretion. As the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
explains, "A discretionary power conferred upon the trustee to deter-
mine the benefits of a trust beneficiary is subject to judicial control
only to prevent misinterpretation or abuse of the discretion by the
trustee."20 If the beneficiary's power to compel a distribution is lim-
ited, a creditor of the beneficiary has no greater power than does the
beneficiary to compel a distribution.
2. Effect of Describing a Trustee's Discretion as "Absolute,"
"Uncontrolled," or "Unconditional"
Even if a settlor uses words such as "absolute," "sole," "unlimited,"
or "uncontrolled" to describe the trustee's discretion, the trustee must
exercise such discretion in good faith and must not act (or refuse to
act) arbitrarily. In re Will of Sullivan2 1 illustrates these very impor-
tant principles. The decedent, John T. Sullivan, provided in his will
that his trustees could act with "full and uncontrolled discretion." Sul-
livan's will directed that the trustees
shall apply the proceeds or the income therefrom for the proper use, support
and maintenance of [the decedent's] son, Lawrence P. Sullivan, as the same is
received by them or as his needs may require or necessitate, and for that pur-
pose may use and apply any part or portion of the principal of said trust estate
from time to time as in their judgment may be required or necessary therefor,
they being the sole judges of such necessity without applying to the courts for
authority so to do, and I declare that said [trustees] shall have full and uncon-
trolled discretion as to the application of said income and trust estate for the
uses aforesaid. 2 2
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §50(1) (2003); § 50 cmt. a (2003).
21. 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
22. Id. at 37-38, 12 N.W.2d at 149.
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Lawrence was wholly incapacitated. His wife's health was "such that
she was unable to support herself." And Lawrence's minor son had "a
physical deformity which require[d] constant medical care and atten-
tion and which limits his earning capacity." Lawrence's wife, brought
suit to compel the trustees to pay for her support and maintenance
and that of Lawrence's minor child. The district court ordered the
trustees to pay $50 per month.
The Nebraska Supreme Court first cited section 157 of the Restate-
ment of Trusts:
The question appears to be one of first impression in this state, and while the
courts of other states have passed upon similar cases, their holdings have not
been uniform. We think the general rule is that a trust for the support and
maintenance of a named beneficiary can be reached to satisfy the claim of a
wife or minor child for support against such beneficiary. This is so, even if the
testamentary provision provides that the trustee is under a duty to support
the named beneficiary and the extent of its exercise is left to the judgment of
the trustee.2
3
Turning to the direction that the trustees "shall have full and un-
controlled discretion as to the said income and trust estate for the uses
aforesaid," the Court relied upon section 187 of the Restatement of
Trusts:
We think the correct statement of the law appears in Restatement, Trusts,
sec. 187(j), wherein it is said: "The settlor may, however, manifest an inten-
tion that the trustee's judgment need not be exercised reasonably, even where
there is a standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can
be judged. This may be indicated by a provision in the trust instrument that
the trustee shall have 'absolute' or 'unlimited' or 'uncontrolled' discretion.
These words are not interpreted literally but are ordinarily construed as
merely dispensing with the standard of reasonableness. In such a case the
mere fact that the trustee has acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judg-
ment is not a sufficient ground for interposition by the court, so long as the
trustee acts in a state of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that
he would act."2 4
However, in this instance, the Trustees had arbitrarily refused to
act when the language of the will required them to act in respect to
providing maintenance and support for Lawrence's spouse and their
son. The Court stated that the trustees
[could not] ignore testator's desire that "they shall apply the proceeds or in-
come therefrom for the proper use, support and maintenance of said son, Law-
rence P. Sullivan," by refusing his needy wife and son support from the trust
fund created for his support. While it may be true that the judgment of the
trustees, when exercised, is final and not subject to review by the courts under
the wording of this particular trust arrangement, they are nevertheless re-
quired to act in respect to providing support for a wife and minor son shown to
be in need thereof.
2 5
23. Id. at 38-39, 12 N.W.2d at 150 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 39-40, 12 N.W.2d at 150 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 187(j) (1935)).
25. Id. at 40, 12 N.W.2d at 150-51.
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Having concluded that the trustees acted arbitrarily, the Nebraska
Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the district court's determina-
tion that the trustees be ordered to pay $50 per month, reasoning that
It]he settlor of the trust prescribed that this was to be a duty of the trustees
and clearly the court has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of
the trustees. The court can, in a proper case and by proper proceedings, com-
pel the trustees to carry out the terms of the trust in the manner that the
settlor contemplated that they would act.
2 6
Remanding the case, the Court stated that "the district court should
have entered a decree pointing out the duties of the trustees under the
will and directing that they proceed to act in accordance therewith."
2 7
B. Support Trusts
Support trusts are, conceptually, a subcategory of discretionary
trusts, limited to providing "support" for a beneficiary. Typically, a
support trust would give a trustee discretion to make payments for the
"support and maintenance" of the beneficiary. Courts, such as those
in Nebraska prior to the adoption of the Nebraska UTC, that recog-
nized the special category of support trusts did so to develop rules
about when a beneficiary of such a trust could compel a trustee to
provide support. Those rules helped determine when the creditor of a
beneficiary of a support trust could compel payment by the trustee for
support provided to a beneficiary.
Byron Reed Co. v. Klabunde,28 a 1906 Commissioners' opinion
adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court, applied decisions of other
states in recognizing a distinct category of support trusts. No subse-
quent reported Nebraska decision cites Klabunde for this proposition.
Thus, it is an interesting question whether or not Nebraska still would
have recognized a separate category of "support trust" at the time the
Nebraska UTC was enacted. But, apart from qualification for Medi-
caid or SSI benefits, 29 the answer to that question alone would seem
to have been of no practical significance. If the trust required the
trustee to provide for a beneficiary's support, a creditor could reach
the trust property as soon as the beneficiary had a right to demand
the proceeds, whether or not the trust also contained a spendthrift
26. Id. at 41, 12 N.W.2d at 151 (stating also that "the court cannot act for the trustee
or do anything other than prescribe the minimum or maximum limits within
which the trustees must act and compel such action within such limits").
27. Id. at 42, 12 N.W.2d at 151.
28. 76 Neb. 801, 809, 108 N.W. 133, 135-36 (1906) ("And it is generally held that
where a trust is created for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary,
neither the trustee nor the beneficiary has the power to assign or mortgage the
trust estate without such power is expressly conferred in the instrument creating
the trust.").
29. See discussion infra section II.E.
[Vol. 86:231
NEBRASKA UNIFORM TRUST CODE
provision.30 On the other hand, if the trustee had discretion over the
distribution, depriving the beneficiary of an enforceable right to com-
pel payments from the trust, the property would not have been subject
to the claims of creditors under Nebraska's hybrid discretionary sup-
port trust rules, discussed below. Note also that in Smith v. Smith,3 1
the Nebraska Supreme Court relied on In re Sullivan's Will,32 which
the Court had previously treated in the same manner as a garden va-
riety support trust case when it was decided to trigger the new cate-
gory of hybrid discretionary support trust.
C. Discretionary Support Trusts
A discretionary support trust is a hybrid of the discretionary trust
and the support trust.3 3 A settlor creates a discretionary support
trust when she combines explicit discretionary language "with lan-
guage that, in itself, would be deemed to create a pure support
trust."3 4 The effect of a discretionary support trust is to establish the
minimal distributions a trustee must make to comport with the set-
tlor's intent of providing basic support, while giving the trustee broad
discretionary powers. 35 Nebraska first recognized the discretionary
support trust in Smith v. Smith36 and reiterated that recognition in
Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A.37
1. Smith v. Smith
In Smith, Opal L. Smith and Vern W. Smith, parents of Richard D.
Smith, created nearly identical trusts that provided in pertinent part:
(a) Until the death of my son Richard the Trustee shall pay over to, or for the
benefit of, any one or more of the living members of a class composed of my
son Richard and his issue, so much of the net income and principal of the trust
as the Trustee shall deem to be in the best interests of each such person, from
time to time. Such distributions need not be made equally unto all members
of the class. In determining the amount and frequency of such distributions,
the Trustee shall consider that:
30. See First National Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corporation, 189 Neb. 734, 205
N.W.2d 115 (1973). Cf. Beals v. Croughwell, 140 Neb. 320, 299 N.W. 638 (1941)
(spendthrift provisions provided that trustee could not distribute to insolvent
beneficiary upon termination of the trust), discussed in the text beginning infra
at note 67.
31. 245 Neb. 193, 517 N.W.2d 394 (1994). Discussed infra section II.C.
32. 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943). Discussed supra section II.A.2.
33. The term "discretionary support trust" was first used by Professor Evelyn Gins-
berg Abravanel. Evelyn G. Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 IowA L.
REV. 273 (1983).
34. Id. at 279 n.26.
35. Id. at 290.
36. 246 Neb. 193, 517 N.W.2d 394 (1994).
37. 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000). For another analysis of these cases, see
Ronald R. Volkmer, The Nebraska Uniform Trust Code: Nebraska Trust Law in
Transition, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 74-79 (2003).
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(1) The primary purpose of the trust is to provide for the health, support,
care and maintenance of my son Richard during his lifetime.
(2) The secondary purpose of the trust is to provide for the health, support,
care, comfort and education of the issue of my son Richard in the event the
parents of any such issue are unable to provide the same.
The Trustee shall have full, absolute and uncontrolled discretionary power
and authority to exercise or fail to exercise any and all of the powers, rights
and authorities provided under this Declaration of Trust without license,
leave or order of any court. All decisions made in good faith pursuant to dis-
cretionary powers and authorities herein conferred upon the Trustee shall be
final and conclusive upon all beneficiaries hereunder. 3 8
The trusts also provided that Richard's then living issue would receive
the corpus of the trusts when Richard died.
Iris A. Smith, former wife of Richard, sought to garnish the assets
of these trusts to satisfy child support arrearages owed by Richard.
The Dodge County District Court found that the trusts were discre-
tionary trusts, rather than support trusts, and thus beyond the reach
of any creditors. Iris appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which
held that the trusts were neither discretionary trusts nor support
trusts but instead discretionary support trusts: "The Smith trusts
contain provisions which are in conflict under the facts of the case.
The discretionary provision 39 allows the trustee essentially unlimited
freedom in controlling trust assets; the support provision 4 0 limits the
trustee's power to apply trust assets."4 1 Noting that the trustee ar-
38. Smith, 246 Neb. at 195, 517 N.W.2d at 396-97.
39. The court identified the following trust language as the "discretionary provision":
The Trustee shall have full, absolute and uncontrolled discretionary
power and authority to exercise or fail to exercise any and all of the pow-
ers, rights and authorities provided under this Declaration of Trust
without license, leave or order of any court. All decisions made in good
faith pursuant to discretionary powers and authorities herein conferred
upon the Trustee shall be final and conclusive upon all beneficiaries
hereunder [hereinafter referred to as the discretionary provision].
Id. at 195, 517 N.W.2d at 397.
40. The court identified the following trust language as the 'support provision":
(a) Until the death of my son Richard the Trustee shall pay over to, or for
the benefit of, any one or more of the living members of a class composed
of my son Richard and his issue, so much of the net income and principal
of the trust as the Trustee shall deem to be in the best interests of each
such person, from time to time. Such distributions need not be made
equally unto all members of the class. In determining the amount and
frequency of such distributions, the Trustee shall consider that:
(1) The primary purpose of the trust is to provide for the health, sup-
port, care and maintenance of my son Richard during his lifetime.
(2) The secondary purpose of the trust is to provide for the health,
support, care, comfort and education of the issue of my son Richard in
the event the parents of any such issue are unable to provide the same
[hereinafter referred to as the support provision].
Id. at 195, 517 N.W.2d at 396-97.
41. Id. at 197, 517 N.W.2d at 398.
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gued that the trusts were discretionary trusts while Iris argued that
the trusts were support trusts, the court explained that "[n]either of
these interpretations is correct. The trusts should not be construed as
either type of trust but as a hybrid of the two types of trusts: a discre-
tionary support trust."42
Before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Iris relied on In re Will of
Sullivan43 where the Court acknowledged that the wife was in need
and entitled to support payments, but held that the trial court did not
have the power to set the amount of the support payments. Relying on
sections 187(j) and 187(e) of the Restatement of Trusts,4 4 the Sullivan
Court had explained that by giving the trustees "full and uncontrolled
discretion" over the application of the trust income, the settlor in-
tended that the trustees would carry out the purposes of the trust but
would not be bound by the usual standard of reasonableness that ap-
plies to trustees.4 5 The Sullivan Court concluded:
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the trustees are required to act in re-
spect to providing maintenance and support for plaintiff and her minor son in
accordance with the provisions of the testamentary trust as construed herein.
They cannot ignore testator's desire that "they shall apply the proceeds or
income therefrom for the proper use, support and maintenance of said son,
Lawrence P. Sullivan," by refusing his needy wife and son support from the
trust fund created for his support. While it may be true that the judgment of
the trustees, when exercised, is final and not subject to review by the courts
under the wording of this particular trust arrangement, they are nevertheless
required to act in respect to providing support for a wife and minor son shown
to be in need thereof.4 6
In response to Iris Smith's argument based on In re Will of Sulli-
van, the Court stated in Smith v. Smith that the trust in Sullivan was
a discretionary support trust, even though not identified as such in
the Sullivan opinion:
We find that In re Will of Sullivan does not stand for the proposition that in
all cases the dependents of a beneficiary of a discretionary support trust can
compel a trustee to make payments for their benefit. We interpret the case to
mean that the trustee of a discretionary support trust can be compelled to
carry out the purposes of the trust in good faith. As indicated by the language
of the trusts, the settlors' purpose in creating the trusts was not only to sup-
port the beneficiaries of the trusts, Richard and his issue, but also to grant the
trustee greater liberty in decisionmaking than the trustee of an ordinary sup-
port trust. These purposes must be served by [the trustee]. 4 7
The court concluded that "[olrdinarily, the trustee of a discretion-
ary support trust should consider factors such as the degree of need
experienced by the beneficiaries, the standard of living experienced by
42. Id.
43. 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
44. See supra text accompanying note 23.
45. Sullivan, 144 Neb. at 40, 12 N.W.2d at 150.
46. Id. at 40, 12 N.W.2d at 150-51.
47. Smith, 246 Neb. at 198, 517 N.W.2d at 398.
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the beneficiaries at the time the trust was created, and the financial
relations between the settlor and the beneficiaries prior to the forma-
tion of the trust."48 However, the court explained, in this instance,
payment of the child support arrearage would not further the pur-
poses of the trusts because the beneficiary's two children were emanci-
pated. Thus the court could not compel the trustee to provide support
for the children.
2. Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A.
In Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A.,49 the Court revis-
ited the Smith family trusts. Iris (Smith) Doksansky, the former wife
of Richard Smith, the beneficiary of the Smith trusts, petitioned for an
"equitable assets creditor's bill" to require the trustee to apply future
trust distributions to her judgment for child support arrearages owed
by Richard Smith. The Dodge County District Court dismissed the
petition, stating that the Smith trusts were discretionary support
trusts and that the court could not compel the trustee to make pay-
ments from the trust because to do so would violate the express pur-
pose of the trusts.5 0 The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the
district court.
The Court explained that there are three requirements for an equi-
table assets creditor's bill: "First, the creditor must have a judgment
against the debtor; second, the creditor must 'allege and show that he
has exhausted his remedy at law,' i.e., the creditor must show that
execution has not satisfied the judgment; and finally, the debtor must
have some interest in property that the creditor is unable to reach
through execution." 5 1 Noting that the petition contained sufficient
factual allegations to satisfy the first two requirements, the court ex-
plained that "[tihe dispositive issue is whether Richard's beneficial in-
terest in the discretionary support trusts is an 'interest in property'
which may be reached by an equitable assets creditor's bill to satisfy
[Iris] Doksansky's judgment for child support arrearage." 52 In consid-
ering whether Richard's interest in the discretionary support trust
was an "interest in property" subject to Iris' claim for child support
arrearages, the Court restated and relied upon the earlier dictum in
Summers v. Summers:
In Summers v. Summers, 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964), we held that
an equitable assets creditor's bill could attach to a beneficiary's interest in the
income from a spendthrift trust because of res judicata arising from a prior
judgment from which no appeal was taken. However, we stated that "if this
were a case in which the controlling question was that of whether or not the
48. Id. at 199, 517 N.W.2d at 399.
49. 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000).
50. Id. at 104, 615 N.W.2d at 107.
51. Id. at 105, 615 N.W.2d at 108 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 105, 615 N.W.2d at 108.
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income of this trust could be invaded for the purpose of satisfaction of the
judgment of plaintiff against the [trust beneficiary/judgment debtor] the re-
quired answer would be that it could not."5 3
After noting that the interest subject to an equitable assets credi-
tor's bill can be no greater than the interest of the trust beneficiary,
the Court held:
Under our decision in Smith v. Smith, Richard would have no right to compel
the cotrustees to distribute trust assets for the purpose of satisfying his child
support arrearage even if he wished to do so. [Tihe creditor's rights with re-
spect to property can be no greater than that of the debtor. Thus, because of
the restricted purposes for which assets can be distributed to Richard under
the discretionary support trusts, his beneficial interests therein do not consti-
tute an interest in property which can be reached by an equitable assets credi-
tor's bill in order to satisfy a judgment for child support arrearage where the
children are emancipated. 5 4
Finally and importantly, the Court applied the maxim that "equity
follows the law" with respect to creditor's bills "used to reach equitable
assets or property of a debtor on which execution at law cannot be
levied."55 The Court stated:
In determining whether Richard's beneficial interest in the discretionary sup-
port trusts can be reached by a creditor's bill, we are guided by the maxim
that "equity follows the law" to the extent of "obeying it and conforming to its
general rules and policies whether contained in common law or statute." This
maxim is strictly applicable whenever the rights of the parties are clearly de-
fined and established by the law. 5 6
To the extent that the Nebraska UTC establishes new Nebraska stat-
utory "general rules and policies," the traditional role that equity fol-
lows the law may become significant in the application of
discretionary trust and other trust law situations.
53. Id. at 106, 615 N.W.2d at 109.
54. Id. at 107, 615 N.W.2d at 109-10.
55. Id. at 105, 107, 615 N.W.2d at 108 and 109-10.
56. Id. at 107, 615 N.W.2d at 109-10, (quoting Guy Dean's Lake Shore Marina v.
Ramey, 246 Neb. 258, 264, 514 N.W.2d 129-33 (1994)). The Court added:
Under our decision in Smith v. Smith... Richard would have no right to
compel the cotrustees to distribute trust assets for the purpose of satisfy-
ing his child support arrearage even if he wished to do so. As noted
above, the creditor's rights with respect to property can be no greater
than that of the debtor. Thus because of the restricted purposes for
which assets can be distributed to Richard under the discretionary sup-
port trusts, his beneficial interests therein do not constitute an interest
in property which can be reached by an equitable assets creditor's bill in
order to satisfy a judgment for child support arrearage where the chil-
dren are emancipated.
Id. at 101, 615 N.W.2d at 109-10.
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3. Footnote on Pohlmann v. Nebraska Department of Health
and Human Services
The Pohlmann decision should be read as grounded on both pre-
UTC Nebraska trust law and the law of the Nebraska UTC. The case
was on appeal when the Nebraska UTC became operative on January
1, 2005. The transitional rules of the enactment state that "the code
applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before
January 1, 2005, unless the court finds that application of a particular
provision of the code would substantially interfere with the effective
conduct of the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the par-
ties . . . ."57 As discussed below,58 the circumstances of its briefing on
appeal, the transfer from the Court of Appeals, the argument in the
Supreme Court, and the opinion authored by the same author of the
Doksansky decision, make clear that the Supreme Court considered its
analysis of discretionary trust law to be equally applicable before and
following adoption of the Nebraska UTC.
D. Spendthrift Trusts
The spendthrift trust rules developed to limit claims of benefi-
ciaries' creditors against the trust property. As explained below, the
essential elements of a spendthrift provision were (1) the prohibition
on alienation on the beneficiary's interest by the beneficiary and (2)
the prohibition on creditors of the beneficiary from reaching the bene-
ficiary's interest.
1. Definition of "Spendthrift Provision"
Prior to enactment of the Nebraska UTC, the Nebraska Supreme
Court defined the term "spendthrift provision" in the following way:
"It is now well established that no particular form of words is necessary to
create the restriction. Nor is it necessary that the restriction be expressed
directly in the language of the will. On the other hand, courts look at all of the
provisions of the will, and the circumstances under which it was made, includ-
ing the condition of the beneficiary, and, if the intent to restrict is reasonably
plain from a consideration of all these features, courts will give effect to that
intent.... [citations omitted] The fact of placing property in the hands of a
trustee evidences an intent on the part of the testator to put it beyond the
power of the beneficiary to alienate, or his creditors to seize."5 9
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
58. See discussion infra section III.E.
59. Lancaster County Bank v. Marshel, 130 Neb. 141, 152, 264 N.W. 470, 475-76
(1936) (quoting Jones v. Harrison 7 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1925)). The Court in
Marshel also cited numerous state court decisions also relied upon in the quoted
passage.
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This definition of a spendthrift provision was consistent with the posi-
tion of the Restatement of Trusts.60
2. Nebraska Case Law on Spendthrift Trusts
The Nebraska Supreme Court first recognized the spendthrift
trust in Weller v. Noffsinger.6 1 Calista Blakeney's will left all her real
and personal property to her husband, Daniel H. Blakeney, and to her
son, Frank L. Blakeney, subject to the following conditions:
I wish all my just debts and taxes to be paid. I wish and it is my will that
Robert Williamson... hold said property in trust, and as trustee for my said
husband and my said son, until my son, the said Frank L. Blakeney, shall
arrive at the age of thirty (30) years. And then the said property, all the real
and personal property belonging to my said estate, shall be divided equally
between my said husband, Daniel Blakeney, and my said son, Frank L. Bla-
keney, each to share equally and alike in the division of the same, and the
same to be theirs, their heirs' and assigns' forever. In the interval of time
intervening between my death and the date when my said son, Frank L. Bla-
keney, shall reach the age of thirty (30) years, as above, it is my will that the
said trustee shall collect the rents, issue, and profits of my said estate, and
divide the sum remaining after paying all taxes, charges, and expenses inci-
dent to the proper care of said estate, equally between my said husband,
Daniel Blakeney, and my said son, Frank L. Blakeney. But neither my hus-
band nor son shall be permitted or allowed to further incumber said estate, or
put any charge or lien upon the said estate, during said interval of time that
shall intervene between my death and the period when my son, Frank, shall
reach the age of thirty (30) years, as aforesaid. Nor shall said estate be subject
to any debts contracted by either my said husband or son, other than the said
balance in the hands of said trustee after paying said charges and expenses,
taxes .... 62
Weller, a creditor of Daniel Blakeley and Frank Blakeley, sought to
reach the property held by Robert Williamson as trustee for the bene-
fit of Daniel and Frank. Weller had obtained a judgment against
Daniel and Frank and, pursuant to an execution sale, had received a
sheriffs deed to the property. In response to Weller's action for eject-
ment, Daniel and Frank argued that the trust established by Calista's
will prevented Weller from reaching the trust property. The Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected Weller's argument that the restrictions on
alienation and on creditors' rights contravened public policy. Ac-
knowledging that English law and the law of some other United
States jurisdictions supported Weller's argument, the court nonethe-
less concluded the better rule was "that the inhibitions against alien-
ing and incumbering the property are effective; [and] that the
60. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 152 cmt. c (1935) ("No specific language necessary to
create. No particular form of words is necessary for the creation of a spendthrift
trust. It is sufficient if by the terms of the trust the settlor manifests an intention
to create such a trust ....").
61. 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899).
62. Id. at 457, 77 N.W. at 1076 (emphasis added).
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provision of the will excluding creditors neither trenches upon their
legal rights nor infringes any principle of public policy ... "63
Although Weller made it clear that a spendthrift provision offered
significant protection from claims by a beneficiary's creditors, such
protection was not absolute under Nebraska law. For example, a Ne-
braska settlor could not avail herself of the protection of a spendthrift
provision.6 4 Nebraska case law was consistent with the law in other
states on this issue. 6 5
Once the beneficiary has a legally enforceable claim against the
trust, creditors can reach that claim to the trust property. 66 But, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has ruled definitively that spendthrift pro-
visions are enforceable with respect to final distributions at the time
of trust termination. In Beals v. Croughwell,67 the testamentary trust
provided that "if upon that date [of termination] said nephew Thomas
F. Croughwell, owes no debts which may be enforced against him by
legal process, then in that event, and in that event only" the trust
property shall pass to Thomas F. Croughwell.68 A bankruptcy trustee
brought suit to establish rights on behalf of Thomas against the trust
property. Quoting the Restatement of Trusts, the Court enforced the
spendthrift provision:
Except where a person creates a trust for his own benefit, if it is provided by
the terms of the trust that the beneficiary shall be entitled to receive the prin-
cipal of the trust property only when he shall become financially solvent, his
interest under the trust cannot be reached by his creditors or by his trustee in
bankruptcy.6 9
In many states, courts have allowed spouses, former spouses and
dependent children of spendthrift beneficiaries to satisfy their claims
63. Id. at 462, 77 N.W. at 1078.
64. See, e.g., First National Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 189 Neb. 734, 738, 205
N.W.2d 115, 118 (1973) (citing II SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 156 at 1192 (3d ed. 1967) ("It
is uniformly held to be against public policy to permit a person to tie up his own
property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from
reaching it.")). In First Cadco Corp., the Court held that when a trust with
spendthrift provisions terminated and the beneficiary had the right to demand
distribution from the trustee, "a construction which would allow the spendthrift
protection to continue after the termination of the trust when the beneficiary had
the right to demand delivery would, in effect, allow her to establish a spendthrift
trust for herself." 189 Neb. at 738, 205 N.W.2d at 118.
65. See C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, § 5, 34 A.L.R.2d
1335, 1342 (1954); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 156 (1935); and RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959). Compare that with the relatively recent develop-
ment of state statutory authorization of self-settled spendthrift trusts. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2004), DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 12, §§ 3570 to 3576 (2004),
R.I GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2 to 18-9.2-7 (2004), and NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010 to
166.170 (2004).
66. First National Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 189 Neb. 734, 205 N.W.2d 115 (1973).
67. 140 Neb. 320, 299 N.W. 638 (1941).
68. Id. at 323, 299 N.W. at 639.
69. Id. at 328, 299 N.W. at 641 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 159 (1935)).
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for support from the spendthrift beneficiary's interest.70 Neverthe-
less, the UTC and Nebraska exception to spendthrift protection for
claims under "a judgment or court order against the beneficiary for
support or maintenance" of the beneficiary's child, spouse, or former
spouse 7 1 has been a very controversial policy issue in states consider-
ing enactment of the UTC. Many other states have deleted or modi-
fied these provisions.72
No reported Nebraska judicial decision directly addressed the
question of whether a spendthrift provision offered a beneficiary pro-
tection from the claims of marital or dependent children creditors of
the beneficiary. Thus, it was not clear whether a spouse, a former
spouse, or a dependent child of the beneficiary could satisfy any claims
for support or alimony from the beneficiary's interest in the trust.
Two decisions by the Nebraska Supreme Court involved enforcement
of support and maintenance judgments of current spouses, one of
which also presented claims of minor children, seeking to reach spend-
thrift trust assets. But, the Court did not decide either case on those
issues.73
In Summers v. Summers,74 Stuart Summers was a beneficiary of a
testamentary trust created by his mother, who died in 1938. The trust
included spendthrift language. 7 5 Stuart was married to Elaine Sum-
mers. In 1957, while Elaine and Stuart were residents of Florida, they
separated. Elaine instituted a separate maintenance action against
70. See M. L. Cross, Annotation, Trust Income or Assets as Subject To Claim Against
Beneficiary for Alimony, Maintenance, or Child Support, 91 A.L.R.2d 262 (1963).
71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3848(b) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
72. See Alan Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts: Alive and Well Under
The Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 567, 568-69 (2005). Al-
though the Nebraska UTC is generally applicable "to all trusts created before, on,
or after January 1, 2005," the marital and dependent children creditor provisions
"apply only to trusts which become irrevocable on or after January 1, 2005." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(1) and (d) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
73. Summers v. Summers, 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964); O'Shea v. O'Shea,
191 Neb. 217, 214 N.W.2d 486 (1974). See also Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Ne-
braska, N.A., 206 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000), discussed infra section II.D.2.
74. 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964).
75. The mother's will provided, in pertinent part:
[Alt no time while any of the trusts herein created are in existence shall
a beneficiary have any right or power whatsoever to in any wise assign,
transfer, alienate or encumber any of the incomes or assets of the trust
estate and no persons can have or take through any attempted assign-
ment, transfer, alienation or encumbrance any right or interest of what-
soever kind in any of the incomes or assets of the trust estate. None of
the incomes or the assets of the trust estate shall ever in any wise be
subject to any claim, demand, judgment or garnishment arising or ex-
isting through any act or liability of a beneficiary, and at no time and in
no way shall the Trustee be accountable to any person or persons other
than to the beneficiary directly and personally.
Id. at 367, 128 N.W.2d at 831.
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Stuart in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida. That court is-
sued a decree requiring Stuart to pay Elaine $600 a month; however,
Stuart made no payments under the decree. In an effort to obtain pay-
ment from Stuart's assets and property in Nebraska, Elaine registered
the Florida decree in Douglas County, Nebraska, pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act. Elaine then commenced suit in Nebraska, based on the Florida
judgment, against Stuart and First National Bank of Omaha as trus-
tee of Stuart's mother's testamentary trust. Elaine sought an order
requiring the trustee to pay trust income to her rather than to Stuart.
The Douglas County District Court found that "[tihe bar of a spend-
thrift . . .provision in a trust is ineffective as to maintenance pay-
ments due a wife from her husband but her right to penetrate the bar
is limited to her right to maintenance and may not be extended." 76
Neither Stuart nor the trustee appealed from the district court's
decision.77
When the trustee failed to pay over the full amount required by the
district court's decision, Elaine commenced a second action, again in
the Douglas County District Court. The district court, concluding that
the doctrine of res judicata applied to most of the issues of fact and law
in the second case, issued a decision in favor of Elaine. But, the dis-
trict court also reduced the amount of maintenance to which Elaine
was entitled as an "equitable determination based on the marital
problems of the parties and not necessarily on the registered judg-
ment."78 Elaine sought to restore the reduction on appeal, contending
that the Florida decree was entitled to full faith and credit and that
the determination in the earlier Nebraska District Court proceeding
was res judicata.7 9 The trustee responded on appeal that the spend-
thrift provisions protected the trust funds from Elaine's claim; that
even if the trust could be reached for Elaine's support, the court hav-
ing jurisdiction over the administration of the trust can determine the
76. Id. at 371, 128 N.W.2d at 833-34.
77. Stuart executed a waiver of his right to appeal in which he also requested the
trustee not to appeal on his behalf. See Brief of Appellee First National Bank of
Omaha at 8, Summers v. Summers, 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964) (No.
35650). The trustee asserted the spendthrift provision as a defense in that case
as well as in the second suit. Id. at 6.
78. Summers, 177 Neb. at 372, 128 N.W.2d at 834. Stuart met Elaine at a California
bar in January 1951 and they began dating. They were married six months later
in Reno, Nevada, the afternoon of the same day Stuart was divorced in Reno from
his second wife. See Brief of Appellee [Stuart] Summers at 4-5, Summers v.
Summers 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964) (No. 35650) ("She had previously
been a prima donna ..., was sponsored in some manner .. .by a Walter Gal-
lagher, a married man she met while he was estranged from his wife . . . ." [cita-
tions to trial record omitted]).
79. Brief of Appellant at 4-7, Summers v. Summers, 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829
(1964) (No. 35650)
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amount of support; and, that, with respect to res judicata, the earlier
Nebraska District Court proceeding allowed Elaine to nullify the
spendthrift provisions only for her maintenance and for nothing
more.8 0 In seeking affirmance of the district court, Stuart's position
was that a Nebraska equity court enforcing the Florida judgment
"must be governed by the principles of equity and the public policy of
the state in which the equitable remedy is sought."sl
The Nebraska Supreme Court based its decision on the res judicata
effect of the first Douglas County District Court case. The Court ex-
plained that
[iun both [district court] cases the true question presented was that of whether
or not the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, could, notwithstanding
the positive and clear terms of the restrictions upon the use to which income of
the trust could be put, apply it under some theory to the payment of delin-
quent payments under the Florida judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant Summers for alimony. The district court for Douglas
County in this case and by the judgment in the other case adjudged that this
could properly be done.8 2
The Court then held that the decision in the first district court case,
from which no party appealed, bound the parties. Thus, the Nebraska
Supreme Court concluded that the second district court committed re-
versible error by modifying the decision in the first case.
Because the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the judg-
ment of the first district court case allowing Elaine to reach Stuart's
interest in the trust was final and non-reviewable, the Court was not
required to address the question of whether the first district court de-
cision correctly resolved the spendthrift issue. However, prompted by
an argument made in the trustee's brief,83 the Court stated, in appar-
ent dicta:
In the brief of the trustee herein it directs attention to general observations
made in Restatement, Trusts, 2d, § 157, 8 4 pp. 328 and 329, 8 5 and the Appen-
80. Brief of Appellee First National Bank of Omaha, supra note 77, at 3-4.
81. Brief of Appellee [Stuart] Summers, supra note 78, at 3.
82. Summers, 177 Neb. at 371, 128 N.W.2d at 833.
83. Brief of Appellee First National Bank of Omaha, supra note 77, at 16-18. The
Brief also relied heavily on prior Nebraska law supporting spendthrift provisions
including, Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899), Lancaster
County Bank v. Marshel, 130 Neb. 141, 264 N.W. 470 (1936), and Beals v.
Croughwell, 140 Neb. 320, 299 N.W. 638 (1941).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959) states:
Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest
of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim
against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the wife for
alimony;
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary
supplies furnished to him;
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or
benefit the interest of the beneficiary;
250 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:231
dix, p. 242, and appears to agree that in instances there may be such an inva-
sion, but that under the decisions in this jurisdiction and those of most of the
other jurisdictions, because of the terms of the trust, no such invasion is per-
missible in this case. Numerous cases bearing on this question are cited at pp.
242, 243, and 244 of this Restatement Appendix, some of which support the
right of invasion under conditions such as those of concern here but most of
them do not.
In the light of this, if this were a case in which the controlling question was
that of whether or not the income of this trust could be invaded for the purpose
of satisfaction of the judgment of [Elaine] against [Stuart] the required answer
would be that it could not. The true question is that of whether or not the
judgment in the earlier case on the same pleaded and tried issues as were
pleaded herein and on which trial was had is res judicata on the issue of the
right of [Elaine] to have invaded the income of the trust for the satisfaction of
her judgment against [Stuart]. 8 6
Ten years after the Summers decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court decided O'Shea v. O'Shea,8 7 which, like Summers, involved a
trial court order allowing a current spouse (and dependent children) to
reach a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust.8 8 Like the deci-
sion in Summers, the decision in O'Shea did not reach the question of
(d) by the United States or a State to satisfy a claim against the
beneficiary.
85. Id. at 328-29, cmt. on Clause (a) states:
Even if the clause is construed as applicable to claims of his dependents
for support, it is against public policy to give full effect to the provision.
The beneficiary should not be permitted to have the enjoyment of his
interest under the trust while neglecting to support his dependents. It is
a matter for the exercise of discretion by the court having jurisdiction
over the administration of the trust as to how much of the income under
the trust should be applied for such support and how much the benefici-
ary himself should receive. Even though the beneficiary's wife has ob-
tained a decree for alimony directing the beneficiary to pay certain sums
to her, she cannot compel the trustee to pay her the full amount so de-
creed unless the court which has jurisdiction over the administration of
the trust deems it to be fair to the beneficiary himself to compel the trus-
tee to make such payment.
Id.
86. Summers, 177 Neb. at 370-71, 128 N.W.2d at 833 (emphasis added). Although
the language may be dicta, the trustee asserted the spendthrift provisions as a
defense in both district court proceedings and in the Nebraska Supreme Court on
appeal.
87. 191 Neb. 217, 214 N.W.2d 486 (1974).
88. The opinion states that the trust was a spendthrift trust and paraphrases the
pertinent language of the trust:
On May 14, 1945, Matilde O'Shea, the then widowed mother of John
and Frank, conveyed by deed certain real property in trust to John for
the benefit of Frank. This was a spendthrift trust with the only asset
being the real property described in the trust deed, together with the
rental income from a garage building situated thereon. The conditions of
the trust imposed on John the duty to manage the property, collect the
rents, pay the taxes, insurance, and necessary repairs, and to pay the
net income derived from said property to Frank "for twenty (20) years
from the 25th day of October, 1944. After such period, the said trustee is
directed to convey said trust property to Frank P. O'Shea if he be then
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whether the trial court should have allowed the spouse and dependent
children to reach the interest of the spendthrift beneficiary. The
spouse of the trust beneficiary had obtained a support order against
the trustee from the Scotts Bluff County District Court. The order,
issued in 1961, directed the trustee to "pay from the net income of the
trust the sum of $150 a month until November 1, 1964, and thereafter
the sum of $250 per month for the support of [the beneficiary's spouse
and minor children]."89 The trustee fully complied with the support
order through 1965 but, although there was net income from which
additional payments could have been made, the trustee only partially
complied with the order after 1965.90
The spendthrift beneficiary died in 1970; thereafter, his spouse
(now widow) commenced a separate action against the trustee in the
Scotts Bluff County District Court requesting an accounting and seek-
ing recovery as a judgment creditor against the trustee for the sum
due under the 1961 support order. One issue was whether the trust
had continued after October 25, 1964, the date specified by the settlor
for termination of the trust.9 1 Following the pretrial conference, the
trial court circulated its pretrial report, which expressly found that
the trust continued until October 5, 1970, when the spendthrift benefi-
ciary died.92 Although the trial court's pretrial report stated that
"[any party may except to this Report in writing within 10 days from
date," no party excepted to the report, and the court tried the case on
the issues fixed in the report.
Two months after the case was tried, but while the trial court still
had the case under advisement, the trustee moved to correct the pre-
trial report to state that the trust had terminated on October 25, 1964.
The trial court denied the motion and determined the amount due to
the spouse of the spendthrift beneficiary based on the termination of
the trust on October 5, 1970. The trustee appealed, and the Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the trial court based on
living or to his heirs at law if he be not living." The terms of the trust
denied Frank the right to convey or encumber the property or its income.
Id. at 218-19, 214 N.W.2d at 487-88.
89. Id. at 220, 214 N.W.2d at 488.
90. Id.
91. The settlor's trust provided:
The conditions of the trust imposed on John the duty to manage the
property, collect the rents, pay the taxes, insurance, and necessary re-
pairs, and to pay the net income derived from said property to Frank "for
twenty (20) years from the 25th day of October, 1944. After such period,
the said trustee is directed to convey said trust property to Frank P.
O'Shea if he be then living or to his heirs at law if he be not living."
Id. at 218-19, 214 N.W.2d at 487-88.
92. Id. at 220, 214 N.W.2d at 488.
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the pretrial order,9 3 with a recalculation using the trial evidence of
the amount owed to the spouse.9 4 The court did not cite Summers,
and the briefs of the parties did not mention that case. Other than
noting that this case involved a spendthrift trust, the opinion does not
consider issues relating to the spendthrift provisions.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's most recent statement with re-
spect to the question of whether there are circumstances in which a
marital creditor can reach the interest of a spendthrift trust benefici-
ary appears in Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A.,95 one of
the hybrid discretionary support trust cases discussed above. In the
course of its opinion in Doksansky, the Court recited the dicta from
Summers, with approval.9 6 The reference to Summers in Doksansky
is clearly additional dicta as the trust in Doksansky was considered to
be a discretionary support trust, not a spendthrift trust. Although it
is difficult to say whether the recognition of an exception to spend-
thrift protection for marital creditors currently reflects a majority
view in the United States, such an exception is widely recognized. 9 7
Both the first and second editions of the Restatement of Trusts recog-
nized this exception. 98 Thus, if the dicta in Summers and Doksansky
in fact reflected the fixed view of the Nebraska Supreme Court, the
Court rejected substantial support for the exception as well as the con-
93. We hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse
to amend its pretrial order 60 days after the trial. It was not incumbent
on [the spouse of the spendthrift beneficiary] to prove that which was
admitted in the pretrial report and to which [the trustee] made no timely
exception. Under the facts in this case, the finding of the trial court that
the trust terminated on the death of [the spendthrift beneficiary] on Oc-
tober 5, 1970, is correct.
Id. at 222, 214 N.W.2d at 489.
94. Id. at 223, 214 N.W.2d at 490.
95. 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000).
96. In a discussion of Nebraska law relating to whether a beneficiary's beneficial in-
terest in a "discretionary support trust" is an "interest in property" that may be
reached by an equitable assets creditor's bill to satisfy a judgment for child sup-
port arrearages, the court stated:
In Summers v. Summers, 177 Neb. 365, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964), we held
that an equitable assets creditor's bill could attach to a beneficiary's in-
terest in the income from a spendthrift trust because of res judicata aris-
ing from a prior judgment from which no appeal was taken. However,
we stated that "if this were a case in which the controlling question was
that of whether or not the income of this trust could be invaded for the
purpose of satisfaction of the judgment of plaintiff against the [trust ben-
eficiary/judgment debtor] the required answer would be that it could
not."
Doksansky, 260 Neb. at 106, 615 N.W.2d at 109 (quoting Summers, 177 Neb. at
371, 128 N.W.2d at 833.
97. See Cross, supra note 70.
98. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 157 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157
(1959).
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sistent position taken by the Restatement of Trusts.99 The language of
the first and second editions of the Restatement of Trusts now appears
in section 59 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (2003). Section
503(b) of the UTC, now section 30-3848(b) in the Nebraska UTC,100 is
intended to codify the long standing statements in the Restatement of
Trusts.lol In any event, the Nebraska Supreme Court had not
squarely addressed this issue prior to the enactment of the Nebraska
UTC in a case where a determination of the issue was necessary for its
decision.
E. Special Needs Trusts
A special needs trust, sometimes also called a supplemental needs
trust, provides additional benefits to a disabled beneficiary without
causing the beneficiary to lose public benefits such as SSI and Medi-
caid.10 2 The trust assets may consist of property transferred by a par-
ent or other relative of the disabled beneficiary or of property awarded
to the disabled beneficiary as a result of, for example, a personal in-
jury action.1O3 Different rules apply to special needs trusts created by
parents or relatives with their property and special needs trusts cre-
ated using money or property of the disabled person.
1. Trusts Funded By Third Parties
If a parent or other relative of a disabled beneficiary uses assets to
create a special needs trust, the settlor must follow rules established
by the Social Security Administration ("SSA") to avoid having the
trust assets considered as "available" to the disabled beneficiary. The
SSA's "Program Operation Manual" describes a "supplemental (spe-
cial) needs trust" as
99. See Volkmer, supra note 37, at 77-78 (stating that "to the extent that Summers
and Doksansky imply that the spendthrift clause is effective to bar maintenance
claims by ex-spouses, that would mean that Nebraska was consciously following
a minority rule and not following the rule articulated in section 157 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts").
100. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3848(b) (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B. 124, §§ 22 to
28, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
101. See UTC § 503 cmt (2005):
The exception in subsection (b) for judgments or orders to support a ben-
eficiary's child or current or former spouse is in accord with Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 59(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999), Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 157(a) (1959), and numerous state statutes. It
is also consistent with federal bankruptcy law, which exempts such sup-
port orders from discharge.
Id.
102. Jennifer Field, Special Needs Trusts: Providing for Disabled Children Without
Sacrificing Public Benefits, 24 J. Juv. L. 79, 79-80 (2004).
103. Id.
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a type of trust that limits the trustee's discretion as to the purpose of the
distributions. This type of trust typically contains language that distributions
should supplement, but not supplant, sources of income including SSI or other
government benefits.
1 0 4
If a special needs trust funded with property of a third party is irrevo-
cable, only benefits the disabled beneficiary, and has identifiable
residual beneficiaries, the trust should not be an "available" asset for
the disabled trust beneficiary.
2. Trusts Funded with Property of the Beneficiary
Drafters of special needs trusts funded with money or property of
the beneficiary must pay special attention to 42 U.S.C. section
1396p(d)(4), which provides that, in general, assets of such trusts will
be treated as "available" to the disabled beneficiary except in the fol-
lowing situations:
1. A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is disabled
(as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 1382c(a)(3)) if established for the benefit of
such individual by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian of the individual, or
a court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the
death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance
paid on behalf of the individual under the State's Medicaid and Supplemental
Security Income plan.1 0
5
2. A trust established in a State for the benefit of an individual if-
a. the trust is composed only of pension, Social Security, and other income
to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust),
b. the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death
of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance
paid on behalf of the individual under the State's Medicaid or Supplemen-
tal Security Income plan, and
c. the State makes medical assistance available to individuals described in
42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V), but does not make such assis-
tance available to individuals for nursing facility services under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1396a(a)(10)(C). 1 0 6
3. A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as defined in
42 U.S.C. Section 1382c(a)(3)) that meets the following conditions:
a. The trust is established and managed by a nonprofit association.
b. A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, but,
for purposes of investment and management of funds, the trust pools
these accounts.
104. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, § SI 01120.200(B)(13), DEFINI-
TIONS OF SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST, available at https://s044a90.ssa.gov/
appslO/poms.nsfflnx/0501120200.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). See also Soc. SEC. ADMIN.,
PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, § SI 01120.203(B) (relating to special needs
trusts established under Section 1917(d)(4)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), available at https://s044a90.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsf/
lnx/0501120203.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
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c. Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of individuals
who are disabled (as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 1382c(a)(3)) by the par-
ent, grandparent, or legal guardian of such individuals, by such individu-
als, or by a court.
d. To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon
the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust pays to
the State from such remaining amounts in the account an amount equal to
the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary
under the State's Medicaid or Supplemental Security Income plan.107
III. DISCRETIONARY AND SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS UNDER
THE NEBRASKA UTC
A. Overview
The Nebraska UTC codifies much of prior Nebraska case law on
discretionary and spendthrift trusts. Throughout its history, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has relied heavily on the text and policies of
the successive A.L.I. Restatements of the Law of Trusts. The UTC is
patterned closely on the current Restatement (Third) of Trusts. The
primary (and beneficial) changes accomplished by the Nebraska UTC
are:
1. Discretionary Trusts
a. Distinctions Among Types of Discretionary Trusts
Abolished
The Nebraska UTC, following the position of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts,108 recognizes the distinction between mandatory
trusts and discretionary trusts but does not continue the nominal Ne-
braska case law distinctions among discretionary trusts, support
trusts, and discretionary support trusts.10 9 However, this change is a
change in terminology and not in substance. Read in light of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's decision in Pohlmann, the term "discretion-
ary trust" as used in the Nebraska UTC will include trusts formerly
known as discretionary support trusts.1 10 The term "discretionary
trust" will also include trusts formerly known as support trusts un-
less, under the terms of the trust,"' the beneficiary can compel distri-
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) (emphasis added).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60, reporter's notes to cmt. a (2003).
109. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849 (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B. 124, § 25,
100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
110. See Pohlman v. Nebraska Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 271 Neb. 272,
279-81, 710 N.W.2d 639, 645-46 (2006).
111. See § 30-3803(19) (defining the phrase "terms of the trust" as "the manifestation
of the settlor's intent regarding a trust's provisions as expressed in the trust in-
strument or as may be established by other evidence that would be admissible in
a judicial proceeding").
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butions of income, principal, or both for expenses necessary for the
beneficiary's support. 112
b. Marital Creditors and Children Afforded Limited Right to
Reach a Beneficiary's Interest in a Discretionary
Trust
Under very limited circumstances, a beneficiary's spouse, former
spouse, or child who holds a judgment or court order for support or
maintenance can reach the beneficiary's interest in a discretionary
trust.1 1 3 Section 30-3849(c) clearly changes the prior Nebraska rule
that creditors of a beneficiary of a pure discretionary trust could not
reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust for any reason. However,
the Nebraska UTC position is consistent with the majority rule in
other states and, like the similar change in the law of spendthrift
trusts, reflects a proper public policy balance between a person's mari-
tal obligations and a settlor's interest in protecting a beneficiary from
claims of creditors. As with the similar spendthrift trust exception,
this exception is narrowly tailored. Only a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the beneficiary can claim the exemption, and then only if that
person has a judgment or court order "for support or maintenance."
Further, the claimant must show that the trustee has not complied
with a standard of distribution or has abused a discretion.114 Finally,
the court must base the order to pay the child, spouse, or former
spouse on what "is equitable under the circumstances"115 and, in any
event, must not direct payment of more than the amount the trustee
would have been required to distribute had the trustee complied with
112. See Pohlman, 271 Neb. at 279-81, 710 N.W.2d at 645-46.
113. See § 30-3849(c).
(c) To the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of distribu-
tion or has abused a discretion:
(1) a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judgment or
court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance of the ben-
eficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse; and
(2) the court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or
former spouse such amount as is equitable under the circumstances but
not more than the amount the trustee would have been required to dis-
tribute to or for the benefit of the beneficiary had the trustee complied
with the standard or not abused the discretion.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. "While a creditor of a beneficiary generally may not assert that a trustee has
abused discretion or failed to comply with a standard of distribution, such a claim
may be asserted by the beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse enforcing a
judgment or court order against the beneficiary for unpaid support or mainte-
nance." UTC § 504 cmt. (2005).
115. "Before fixing [the amount to be paid to the child, spouse, or former spouse], the
court having jurisdiction over the trust should consider that in setting the respec-
tive support award, the family court has already considered the respective needs
and assets of the family." UTC § 504 cmt. (2005).
[Vol. 86:231
NEBRASKA UNIFORM TRUST CODE
the standard or not abuse the discretion. The Nebraska UTC now con-
tains the current national UTC language:
[ilf the trustee's or cotrustee's discretion to make distributions for the trus-
tee's or cotrustee's own benefit is limited by an ascertainable standard, a cred-
itor may not reach or compel distribution of the beneficial interest except to
the extent the interest would be subject to the creditor's claim were the benefi-
ciary not acting as trustee or cotrustee. 1 16
2. Spendthrift Trusts
The Nebraska UTC makes two changes and one clarification relat-
ing to the extent of spendthrift protection.117 The two changes appear
in section 30-3848(b), as amended in 2007, to use the revised official
UTC language:
(b) A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against:
(1) a beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or
court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance; [and]
(2) a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection of a
beneficiary's interest in the trust .... 118
a. Marital Creditors and Children Afforded Limited Right to
Reach a Beneficiary's Interest in a Spendthrift Trust
As to the support or maintenance judgment claims of marital credi-
tors and dependent children, the Nebraska UTC takes a position con-
trary to the Nebraska Supreme Court's dicta discussed above. To the
extent trial courts in Nebraska have adopted the dicta, and to the ex-
tent that the Nebraska Supreme Court, if actually presented with the
issue would have taken the position expressed in the dicta, the Ne-
braska UTC changes Nebraska law. However, the Nebraska UTC po-
sition is consistent with the majority rule in other states and reflects a
proper legislative policy balance between a person's marital obliga-
tions and a settlor's interest in protecting the settlor's property and a
trust beneficiary from claims of creditors. Further, the exception is
narrowly tailored. Only a spouse, former spouse, or child of the bene-
ficiary can claim the exemption, and then only if that person has a
judgment or court order "for support or maintenance."
116. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(e) (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B. 124, § 27,
100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
117. Section 30-3847(b) provides that "[a] term of a trust providing that the interest of
a beneficiary is held subject to a 'spendthrift trust', or words of similar import, is
sufficient to restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's
interest."
118. § 30-3848(b), amended by L.B. 124, § 27, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
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b. Judgment Creditors Who Provided Services for Protection
of Beneficiary's Interest in a Spendthrift Trust
As to the new exception for judgment creditors who have provided
services for the beneficiary's interest in the trust, there was no prior
reported Nebraska law dealing with this issue. However, the excep-
tion is consistent with both the Restatement (Second) of Trusts119 and
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.12 0 The Nebraska Supreme Court
has followed or cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts; therefore, it might have followed this rule prior to enactment
of the Nebraska UTC. Further, as the Comment to the UTC explains,
"This exception allows a beneficiary of modest means to overcome an
obstacle preventing the beneficiary's obtaining services essential to
the protection or enforcement of the beneficiary's rights under the
trust."121 Thus, this exception does not represent a significant erosion
of spendthrift protection.
c. Claims of the State of Nebraska or the United States
Finally, as to the clarification of the extent of spendthrift protec-
tion, section 30-3848(b)(3) (as amended in 2007) of the Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes provides that "[a] spendthrift provision is
unenforceable against:... (3) a claim of this state or the United States
to the extent a statute of this state or federal law so provides" (emphasis
added). The UTC section has drawn unjustified criticism from com-
mentators who contend that the UTC seriously limits the asset protec-
tion offered by spendthrift trusts. These commentators assert that
UTC section 503(b)(3) will cause Congress and state legislatures to
enact legislation creating spendthrift exceptions for multitudes of fed-
eral and state claims.122 Congress and state legislatures could, of
course, do so even if UTC Section 503(b)(3) did not exist. In fact, sec-
tion 30-3848(b)(3) makes it clear that either the Nebraska Legislature
or Congress would have to enact a statute overriding spendthrift pro-
tection. Thus, the provision precludes a successful argument either by
the state or federal government for an exception to spendthrift protec-
tion based solely on a policy analysis. Section 30-3848(b)(3) gives the
government no additional power to break through spendthrift
protection.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157(c) (1959).
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
121. LTTC § 503 cmt (2005).
122. See, e.g., Merric & Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be
Affected by the UTC?, supra note 4 at 484 ("Once the state governmental agencies
realize that they no longer may recover from this type of trust, it may be only a
matter of time before the state or federal government is able to convince state
legislators to add them as an exception creditor.").
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B. The Conceptual Framework of the Nebraska UTC for
Discretionary and Spendthrift Trusts
For purposes of determining the ability of a creditor of a trust ben-
eficiary to reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust, the UTC and
Nebraska UTC identify two classes of trusts: spendthrift trusts and
discretionary trusts. 12 3 This conceptual framework is simple and
sensible:
SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION-If a settlor wishes to prevent the creditor of a trust
beneficiary from attaching the beneficiary's interest in the trust, the settlor
must include a spendthrift provision covering the beneficiary's interest. With
three exceptions, a creditor of the beneficiary cannot reach the beneficiary's
interest in a spendthrift trust before its receipt by the beneficiary: 1 2 4 (1) "a
beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or court or-
der against the beneficiary for support or maintenance"; (2) "a judgment credi-
tor who has provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in
the trust"; or (3) "a claim of this state or the United States to the extent a
statute of this state or the federal law so provides." 1 2 5
No SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION-If a settlor does not include a spendthrift pro-
vision, the court may authorize the creditor to attach the beneficiary's interest
in the trust. 1 2 6 Because the proceedings against the trust are equitable in
nature, "[t]he court may limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under
the circumstances." 1 2 7 If the creditor obtains an attachment, "the trustee
will then pay to the creditor instead of the beneficiary any payments the trus-
tee would otherwise be required to make to the beneficiary, as well as discre-
tionary distributions the trustee decides to make."1 2 8
DISCRETIONARY TRUsT-Regardless of whether the settlor has included a
spendthrift provision, if the settlor has given the trustee discretion over
whether or when to make distributions to the beneficiary, the creditor's power
to compel a discretionary distribution is very limited. A creditor cannot reach
the beneficiary's interest in a discretionary trust even if the trustee's discre-
tion is expressed in the form of a standard for distribution or the trustee has
abused its discretion, 1 2 9 with just one exception: "a distribution may be or-
123. The Nebraska UTC tracks the official text of UTC Part 5, Creditor's Claims;
Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts, including all of the most recent technical,
clarifying amendments in the current March 7, 2005, version of the UTC. Those
changes can be identified in L.B. 124, §§ 22 to 28, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007),
signed by the Governor on March 19, 2007.
124. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3847(c) (Cum. Supp. 2006). But see § 30-3851(b), amended
by L.B. 124, § 26, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007) which states:
Whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor or
assignee of a beneficiary may reach a mandatory distribution of income
or principal, including a distribution upon termination of the trust, if the
trustee has not made the distribution to the beneficiary within a reason-
able time after the designated distribution date.
125. § 30-3848(b) & (c), amended by L.B. 124, § 24, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007),
which also provides that "[tihe court may limit the award to such relief as is
appropriate under the circumstances."
126. § 30-3846, amended by L.B. 124, § 23, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
127. Id.; see UTC § 501 cmt (2005).
128. UTC § 501 cmt. (2005) (emphasis added).
129. § 30-3849(b).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dered by the court to satisfy a judgment or court order against the beneficiary
for support or maintenance of the beneficiary's child, spouse, or former
spouse." 1 3 0 To the extent the trustee has not complied with a standard of
distribution or has abused a discretion with respect to a child, spouse or for-
mer spouse having a judgment or court order for support or maintenance, the
court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or former spouse such
amount as is equitable under the circumstances but not more than the amount
the trustee would have been required to distribute to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary had the trustee complied with the standard or not abused the
discretion. 1
3 1
Note that the question of whether a trust is "mandatory" or "discre-
tionary" depends on the terms of a trust. The Nebraska UTC defines
the phrase "terms of a trust" as "the manifestation of the settlor's in-
tent regarding a trust's provisions as expressed in the trust instru-
ment or as may be established by other evidence that would be
admissible in a judicial proceeding."132 The official text of the Uni-
form Trust Code contains a definition of "mandatory" distribution
which has been enacted in Nebraska and which clarifies but does not
change the current Nebraska UTC.133
A beneficiary of a "mandatory trust" can "maintain a judicial pro-
ceeding against a trustee for ... failure to comply with a standad for
distribution."13 4 A creditor or assignee of a beneficiary "may reach a
mandatory distribution of income or principal, including a distribution
upon termination of the trust, if the trustee has not made the distribu-
tion to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the designated
distribution date." 13 5 If the "beneficiary's interest is not protected by
130. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006). Note that section 30-
3849(c)(1) does not include the exception, found in section 30-3848(b), for "a judg-
ment creditor who has provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's inter-
est" in a spendthrift trust.
131. § 30-3849(c)(2) (emphasis added). Section 30-3849(d) provides that § 30-3849
"does not limit the right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial proceeding against
a trustee for an abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard for distri-
bution." A clarifying amendment in LB 124, §25, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007),
deals with a situation where the beneficiary is also a trustee or co-trustee by
amending § 30-3849(e) to read:
(e) If the trustee's or cotrustee's discretion to make distributions for the
trustee's or cotrustee's own benefit is limited by an ascertainable stan-
dard, a creditor may not reach or compel distribution of the beneficial
interest except to the extent the interest would be subject to the credi-
tor's claim were the beneficiary not acting as trustee or cotrustee.
132. § 30-3803(19) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
133. See L.B. 124, § 26, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007), adding the official text defini-
tion of a "mandatory" distribution to § 30-3851 as new section 30-3851(a):
(a) In this section, "mandatory distribution" means a distribution of in-
come or principal which the trustee is required to make to a beneficiary
under the terms of the trust, including a distribution upon termination
of the trust.
134. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(d) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
135. § 30-3851; amended by L.B. 124, § 26 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
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a spendthrift provision, the court may authorize a creditor or assignee
of the beneficiary to reach the beneficiary's interest by attachment of
present or future distributions to or for the beneficiary or other
means."136
C. Trustee Standards of Reasonableness, Good Faith, and a
Grant of "Unlimited Discretion"
Prior Nebraska law reflected in In re Will of Sullivan, Smith v.
Smith, and Doksansky concerning trustee standards of reasonable-
ness, good faith, and "unlimited discretion" has now been codified in
the Nebraska UTC. The basic standard is one of reasonableness: "A
trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by con-
sidering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee
shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution."137 This duty "does
not depend on whether the trustee receives compensation" and "may
be altered by the terms of the trust."138 But, the terms of a trust can-
not modify "the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance
with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the bene-
ficiaries."13 9 The Nebraska UTC provides that: "Upon acceptance of a
trusteeship, the trustee shall administer the trust in good faith, in ac-
cordance with its terms and purposes and interests of the benefi-
ciaries, and in accordance with the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code." 140
The good faith standard remains applicable in all cases whether or not
the terms of the trust may alter the reasonableness standard and em-
power the trustee to possess "absolute," "sole," or "uncontrolled"
discretion. 141
Smith v. Smith said that In re Will of Sullivan "does not stand for
the proposition that in all cases the dependents of a beneficiary of a
discretionary support trust can compel a trustee to make payments for
their benefit."142 Quoting directly from Sullivan, the Court explained:
136. § 30-3846 ("The court may limit the award to such relief as is appropriate under
the circumstances.").
137. § 30-3869.
138. UTC § 804 cmt. (2005). The UTC was amended on March 7, 2005.
139. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B. 124, § 22,
100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007). An exculpatory provision in a trust cannot relieve
"the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries."
§§ 30-3805(b)(9), 30-3897(a)(1).
140. § 30-3866.
141. § 30-3879(a) ("Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in
the terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as 'absolute', 'sole', or 'un-
controlled', the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries.").
142. Smith v. Smith, 246 Neb. 193, 198, 517 N.W.2d 394, 398 (1994).
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The settlor may, however, manifest an intention that the trustee's judgment
need not be exercised reasonably .... [Words which purport to give trustees
unlimited discretion] are not interpreted literally but are ordinarily construed
as merely dispensing with the standard of reasonableness .... Thus, the trus-
tee will not be permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, or ordinarily to act arbitrar-
ily without an exercise of his judgment. 143
Doksansky then relied on Smith v. Smith as having
determined that the trustee of a discretionary support trust could be "com-
pelled to carry out the purposes of the trust in good faith," but concluded that
the payment of the child support arrearage, which was the subject of [the ac-
tion in both Doksansky and Smith v. Smithl, "would not further the purposes
of the trusts, since the children are emancipated."
1 4 4
Pohlmann v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services145
applies this rationale, citing Smith v. Smith and Doksansky, to a trust
in which the directions to the trustee were stated in mandatory terms
that discretion be exercised but in permissive, judgmental terms as to
how that discretion should be exercised.
D. The Roles of the Trustee and the Court in Dealing with
Discretion
In general, the settlor confers on the trustee such discretion as the
settlor believes is necessary to accomplish the purposes of the trust.
However, even a grant of "absolute discretion" cannot absolve the
trustee of the bedrock "duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests
of the beneficiaries."1 46 Thus, although "[a] court will not interfere
with a trustee's exercise of a discretionary power when that exercise is
reasonable and not based on an improper interpretation of the terms
of the trust,"147 "a court will not permit abuse of discretion by the
trustee."'148 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that "[wihat
constitutes abuse depends on the terms of the trust, as well as on basic
fiduciary duties and principles .... Of particular importance are the
purposes of the power and the standards, if any, applicable to its exer-
cise . . . and the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trus-
tee .... "149 Finally, note that
143. 246 Neb. at 198-99, 517 N.W.2d at 398-99 (deletions and brackets in original
text). The opinion also cites as "Accord," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 187, comment j. In fact, the Court in In re Will of Sullivan was quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, comment j.
144. Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, 260 Neb. 100, 106-07, 615 N.W.2d 104,
109 (2000) (quoting Smith, 246 Neb. at 198, 517 N.W.2d at 398).
145. 271 Neb. 272, 710 N.W.2d 639 (2006).
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006), amended by L.B. 124, § 22,
100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50, general cmt. b at 260 (2003).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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a court will intervene where the exercise of a power is left to the judgment of a
trustee who improperly fails to exercise that judgment. Thus, even where a
trustee has discretion whether or not to make any payments to a particular
beneficiary, the court will interpose if the trustee, arbitrarily or without
knowledge of or inquiry into relevant circumstances, fails to exercise the
discretion. 1 5 0
The basic rules defining "discretion," interpreting the scope of a
trustee's discretion, and considering the role of a court with respect to
the exercise or nonexercise of discretion by a trustee have remained
unchanged by the Nebraska UTC.151 The parameters of judicial over-
sight of a trustee's discretion were stated in In re Sullivan's Will:
This holding [that the trustees had failed "to act in respect to providing sup-
port for a wife and minor son shown to be in need thereof"] makes it necessary
for us to consider the form of the decree or judgment which can properly be
entered in a case of this kind. It appears clear at the outset that the court was
without authority to determine the amount of support to which plaintiff was
entitled from the trust fund. The settlor of the trust prescribed that this was
to be a duty of the trustees and clearly the court has no authority to substitute
its judgment for that of the trustees. The court can, in a proper case and by
proper proceedings compel the trustees to carry out the terms of the trust in
the manner that the settlor contemplated that they would act. But the court
cannot act for the trustee or do anything other than prescribe the minimum or
maximum limits within which the trustees must act and compel such action
within such limits.1 5 2
The Court added what would appear to be hornbook law that:
When the court controls the exercise of a power by the trustee, it may do so by
directing him to act or refrain from acting; by setting aside the transaction
where he has already acted; or by holding him liable for the results of his
action or non-action. The court will sometimes remove a trustee or deny or
diminish his compensation where he has abused discretion conferred upon
him. 1 5 3
The rationale of the former Restatements of Trusts § 187 and In re Sul-
livan's Will are now reflected in Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50,
Enforcement and Construction of Discretionary Interests.
E. Pohlmann v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human
Services
Pohlmann v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices 154 is a solid and important link in defining the interest of a bene-
150. Id. at 261.
151. For a detailed analysis of a court's power to review a trustee's refusal to exercise
discretion to terminate a trust, see Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239
(1956).
152. 144 Neb. 36, 40-41, 12 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1943) (Terms of the trust had dispensed
with the usual standard of reasonableness, the trustees had failed to act, and the
lower court had ordered a specific amount to be paid.).
153. Id. at 42, 12 N.W.2d at 151 (holding that the district court erred in ordering $50
per month to be paid for support) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 187(b)(1935)).
154. 271 Neb. 272, 710 N.W.2d 639 (2006).
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ficiary under the Nebraska UTC when the settlor has given the
trustee what, under the case law prior to adoption of the Nebraska
UTC, was called discretionary support authority. The Court's opinion
in Pohlmann was authored by Justice Kenneth C. Stephan, who wrote
the Court's opinion in Doksansky. 155 The case was pending in the
Court of Appeals on January 1, 2005, but later transferred to the Su-
preme Court for argument and decision.156 The briefs of the parties in
Pohlmann did not cite the Nebraska UTC, Doksansky, or the Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts, but each found its way into the Court's
opinion.
Pohlmann involved "the question of whether the corpus of an irrev-
ocable discretionary testamentary trust is a resource available to the
beneficiary spouse of the grantor for purposes of determining the
spouse's eligibility for Medicaid benefits."157 As stated in the opinion:
"The will directed that Ruth was to receive from the Family Trust 'all
of the accumulative income from the individual funds and such por-
tion of the principal as [the trustee] may, from time to time, deem
appropriate for her health, education, support or maintenance."'158
The Court held that the corpus of the trust was not a disqualifying
available resource attributable to Ruth's spouse inasmuch as it was a
testamentary trust established by her spouse's will, specifically ex-
empted under the controlling Medicaid statute.159 It avoided the
question of whether Ruth's failure to elect to take against the will ren-
dered the testamentary trust established under the will her own self-
settled trust for Medicaid eligibility purposes because that issue "was
not presented to or passed upon by the trial court."160 Nevertheless,
155. Justice Stephan also wrote one of the Court's two decisions in February 2005 that
applied the Nebraska UTC to cases pending in the Supreme Court on January 1,
2005, the operative date of the Nebraska UTC. See In re Trust of Inman, 269
Neb. 376, 693 N.W.2d 514 (2005) (Stephan, J.); In re Trust of Rosenberg, 269 Neb.
310, 693 N.W.2d 500 (2005) (McCormack, J.).
156. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals, after the briefs were filed, by
an order of the Supreme Court on June 3, 2005, without statement of a reason for
the transfer.
157. Pohlmann, 271 Neb. at 275, 710 N.W.2d at 642.
158. Id. at 273 710 N.W.2d at 641.
159. Id. at 275-79, 710 N.W.2d at 642-44. The Court acknowledged that the statutory
exemption of testamentary trusts seems inconsistent "with the underlying pur-
pose of Medicaid, which is to provide medical assistance to those who have no
other financial means," but declined to substitute its "'own ideas of what might
be a wise provision in place of a clear expression of legislative will.'" Id. (quoting
Skindzier v. Commissioner of Social Services, 258 Conn. 642, 661, 784 A.2d 323,
336 (2001)).
160. Id. at 279, 710 N.W.2d 644-45. If this question is presented directly in a subse-
quent case, the court should hold that a surviving spouse's decision not to elect a
share of the deceased spouse's augmented estate does not cause a testamentary
trust created by the decedent spouse's will to be treated as a self-settled trust
created by the surviving spouse for two reasons. First, to hold otherwise would
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the Court concluded that the Nebraska Medicaid Regulations required
a determination of whether the terms of the testamentary trust pro-
vided an available resource in determining Ruth's Medicaid
eligibility.161
The Brief of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices quoted the provision in the will as follows: "the '[t]rustee shall
pay to my spouse . . . such portion of that principal as it may, from
time to time, deem appropriate for her health, education support or
maintenance."'162 Following that, the Brief argued:
This being the case, there is little doubt that Mrs. Pohlmann is in need of
payment for her health, support, and maintenance. The petitioner, in fact, is
making just that claim when applying for Medicaid benefits. It is unreasona-
ble to think that a trustee would deny payment of the trust principal to Mrs.
Pohlmann given the current circumstances. 163
The matter was argued in the Supreme Court before well-pre-
pared, active Justices.164 Counsel for the Department of Health and
Human Services was asked by an unidentified Justice: "[Alt least the
corpus provisions are discretionary, aren't they?"165 Counsel re-
sponded: "No, I think it only gives the trustee discretion as to how
much to pay."166 Later, an unidentified Justice asked: "Could the
trustee deem nothing to be appropriate?"167 Counsel replied: "We
would argue that would be a violation of the spirit of the word 'shall,'
that they would deem nothing appropriate ..... The trustee is obli-
gated by the word 'shall' to make a determination as to what is appro-
priate for health, education, support or maintenance and to pay in
accordance with that determination." 168 An unidentified Justice then
take something that, for sound policy purposes, the legislature intends to be elec-
tive, and in effect make the election mandatory solely to serve a federal purpose.
Second, forcing the surviving spouse to make the election would be an end run on
the federal statute's treatment of testamentary trusts. If Congress wishes to
amend the Medicaid statute to require surviving spouses to make such an elec-
tion, Congress may do so, but absent such an amendment, the surviving spouse
should not be forced to make a state law election to accomplish a federal goal.
161. 469 NEB. ADMIN. CODE, § 2-009.07A5g (2001) provided that "[t]estamentary
trusts may be excluded as resources, depending on the availability of the funds to
the individual or his/her spouse as specified in the terms of the trust." The cur-
rent cite for this language is 469 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 2-009.07A5b (2005).
162. Brief of Appellee at 7, Pohlmann v. Nebraska Dep't of Health and Human Ser-
vices, No. A-04-001327 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (case renumbered S-04-1327 follow-
ing transfer from the Court of Appeals to the Nebraska Supreme Court).
163. Id.
164. A transcript of the oral argument, provided by special permission of the Court,
has been placed in the University of Nebraska Law College Library. Transcript
of Oral Argument, Pohlmann v. Nebraska Dep't of Health and Human Serv.
(2006) (No. S-04-1327).
165. Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 13-14.
167. Id. at 14.
168. Id.
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said: "When 'shall' was modified by 'deemed as appropriate,' I'm not
sure it's mandatory anymore, is it?"169 Further responses of Counsel
were that the language did not leave complete discretion in the trustee
whether or not to pay anything for appropriate support from the
corpus of the trust and suggested, additionally, that the trustee's duty
to inquire into the support of the beneficiary made those trust assets
an available resource of the beneficiary for Medicaid purposes. 170
Pohlmann examines the nature of Ruth's interest with references
to the Nebraska UTC, Kansas, and North Dakota decisions distin-
guishing support trusts from discretionary trusts with respect to
Medicaid eligibility determinations, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
and Nebraska's Doksansky and Smith v. Smith hybrid discretionary
support trust decisions. Pohlmann cites the Nebraska UTC for its op-
erative date and definition of "terms of a trust."171 The Kansas and
North Dakota decisions are cited for the proposition that "[iin analyz-
ing the terms of a testamentary trust to determine if the corpus is
'available' to a beneficiary for purposes of Medicaid eligibility, courts
have looked to whether the trust is a support trust or a discretionary
trust."172 The Kansas decision states that "[a] support trust exists
when the trustee is required to inquire into the basic support needs of
the beneficiary and to provide for those needs."173 As quoted in
Pohlmann, the North Dakota decision defines a support trust as one
in which the trustee "shall pay or apply only so much ... as is neces-
sary for the education or support of a beneficiary" and which "allows a
beneficiary to compel distributions of income, principal, or both for ex-
penses necessary for the beneficiary's support." 174 Further,
Pohlmann cites Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 60 (2003) sim-
ply as a "See also" without explanation.17 5 , the bold text of which
states in pertinent part:
[I] f the terms of a trust provide for a beneficiary to receive distributions in the
trustee's discretion, a transferee or creditor of the beneficiary is entitled to
receive or attach any distributions the trustee makes or is required to make in
the exercise of that discretion .... The amounts a creditor can reach may be
limited to provide for the beneficiary's needs ....
169. Id.
170. Id. at 14-15.
171. Pohlmann v. Nebraska Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 271 Neb. 272, 279, 710
N.W.2d 639, 645. Although the trust was irrevocable on January 1, 2005, it
would appear that all relevant provisions of the Nebraska UTC were applicable
to the Court's decision. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
172. Pohlmann, 271 Neb. at 279-80, 710 N.W.2d at 645.
173. Miller v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Serv., 275 Kan. 349, 354, 64 P.3d 395,
400 (2003) ("Eligibility for Medicaid depends on the assets 'available' to the appli-
cant, and the support trust is always considered such an available asset.").
174. Pohlmann, 271 Neb. at 280, 710 N.W.2d 645 (quoting Eckes v. Richland County
Social Services, 621 N.W.2d 851, 855-56 (ND 2001)).
175. Id. at 280, 710 N.W.2d at 645.
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Emphasizing the discretionary language through italics,
Pohlmann refers to the language of the testamentary trust: "The key
provision of the Family Trust stated that the trustee was to pay Ruth
'all of the accumulative income from the individual funds and such
portion of the principal as it may, from time to time, deem appropriate
for her health, education, support or maintenance."'17 6  Then
Pohlmann cites Doksansky and Smith v. Smith for this statement: "Al-
though not in the context of a Medicaid eligibility determination, we
have held that similar powers granted to a trustee do not create a
right of the beneficiary to compel payments from the trust."177
Implicit in the Pohlmann analysis is the conclusion that unless a
trust beneficiary can compel a distribution, the trust is a discretionary
trust. This implicit conclusion seems clear from the Court's character-
ization of the position of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices ("DHHS"): "In this case, DHHS concedes that the Family Trust
is discretionary with respect to distributions of corpus, and we like-
wise conclude."1 78 Although DHHS argued in its Brief and during
oral argument about the nature and extent of the trustee's discretion,
it did not contend that the beneficiary could compel the trustee to
make corpus distributions.
Like the trust terms in Doksansky and Smith v. Smith, the terms
of the Pohlmann trust gave both mandatory and discretionary direc-
tions. The trustee was directed to use discretion in making support
payments to Ruth, the surviving spouse. Pohlmann recognizes that
the terms of the trust can allow the trustee to exercise that discretion
by declining to make a trust distribution in order to carry out the
terms and purposes of the trust.
Although Pohlmann speaks in terms of the standard in other
states for determining available resources for Medicaid based upon
classifications of "support" or "discretionary" trusts, the bottom line of
the Pohlmann analysis is that it classifies "discretionary" trusts as
trusts "which do not create a right of the beneficiary to compel pay-
ments from the trust."17 9 Thus, read in light of Pohlmann, the term
"discretionary trust" as used in the Nebraska UTC will include trusts
formerly known as discretionary support trusts. The term "discretion-
ary trust" will also include trusts formerly known as support trusts
unless, under the terms of the trust,1 8 0 the beneficiary can compel dis-
176. Id. (emphasis in original).
177. Id. at 280, 710 N.W.2d at 645-46
178. Id. at 280, 710 N.W.2d at 646.
179. Id. at 279-81, 710 N.W.2d at 645-46.
180. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(19) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (defining the phrase "terms
of the trust" as "the manifestation of the settlor's intent regarding a trust's provi-
sions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established by other
evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding").
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tributions of income, principal, or both for expenses necessary for the
beneficiary's support.1 8 1
This distinction between mandatory and discretionary distribu-
tions is at the core of Nebraska UTC § 30-3851. At the time of
Pohlmann, that section read:18 2
Whether or not a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor or assignee
of a beneficiary may reach a mandatory distribution of income or principal,
including a distribution upon termination of the trust, if the trustee has not
made the distribution to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the
designated distribution date.
The 2007 Nebraska Legislature added new clarifying language from
the current official text of the 2005 amendments to the UTC regarding
the different rules applicable to mandatory and discretionary
distributions:
In this section, "mandatory distribution" means a distribution of income or
principal which the trustee is required to make to a beneficiary under the
terms of the trust, including a distribution upon termination of the trust. The
term does not include a distribution subject to the exercise of the trustee's
discretion even if (1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of
distribution, or (2) the terms of the trust authorizing a distribution couple
language of discretion with language of direction.
1 8 3
To reach its decision, the Court in Pohlmann considered both the
criteria for Medicaid eligibility and the nature of the trust benefici-
ary's interest. As to the issue of whether or not Ruth's interest was an
available resource for Medicaid eligibility purposes, the Court held
that the determination depended on whether Ruth could compel the
trustee to provide for her support, thus allowing her to avoid applying
for Medicaid benefits. To answer that question, the Court considered
the "terms of the trust" as defined by the Nebraska UTC,184 the na-
ture of a trustee's discretion as stated in Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 60,185 and its decisions in Doksansky and Smith v. Smith.
The Court concluded that the "terms of the trust" manifested the set-
tlor-testator's intention that the trustee could not be required to pay
181. See Pohlmann v. Nebraska Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 271 Neb. 272,
279-81, 710 N.W.2d 639, 645-46 (2006).
182. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3851 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
183. LB 124, § 26, 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
184. "'Terms of a trust' means the manifestation of the settlor's intent regarding a
trust's provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be established
by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-3803(19) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
185. Section 60 states in pertinent part:
[I]f the terms of a trust provide for a beneficiary to receive distributions
in the trustee's discretion, a transferee or creditor of the beneficiary is
entitled to receive or attach any distributions the trustee makes or is
required to make in the exercise of that discretion .... The amounts a
creditor can reach may be limited to provide for the beneficiary's needs.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003).
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Ruth's support, at least to the extent that other resources were availa-
ble. Further, the court concluded, the discretionary powers given to
the trustee did not create a right of the beneficiary to compel pay-
ments from the trust in this situation. "Because Ruth cannot compel a
distribution from the Family Trust corpus, it is not an available asset
for purposes of determining her eligibility for Medicaid benefits."1s
6
IV. IS THE (CREDITOR PROTECTION) SKY REALLY
FALLING?: A BRIEF RESPONSE TO
THE CRITICS OF THE UTC
A. The UTC and Nebraska UTC Rules on Discretionary
Trusts
Those who find fault with UTC section 504 (and by implication Ne-
braska UTC section 30-3849) focus on the following arguments:
1. Elimination of the distinction between discretionary trusts and
support trusts greatly increases the rights of creditors to reach the
interests of beneficiaries of discretionary trusts.' 8 7 This argument
simply does not withstand a careful reading of UTC section 504. UTC
section 504(b) makes it clear that regardless of whether a trust in-
cludes a spendthrift provision, "a creditor of a beneficiary may not
compel a distribution that is subject to the trustee's discretion, even if:
(1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution;
or (2) the trustee has abused the discretion."1 8 8 Professor Robert T.
Danforth explains that UTC section 504(b) not only does not give cred-
itors additional rights, UTC section 504(b) strengthens protection
against claims of creditors:
First, even a supplier of necessaries cannot compel distributions from a sup-
port trust. Second, the statute eliminates any argument that a support inter-
est should be treated as mandatory and thus subject to compelled
distributions to certain creditors, who would stand in the beneficiary's shoes.
Third, the statute eliminates any argument that a creditor, under some cir-
cumstances, might be able to reach a discretionary interest, under the theory
186. Pohlmann, 271 Neb. at 280-81, 710 N.W.2d at 646. The Court reiterated this
point in its Conclusion: 'We conclude as a matter of law that the Family Trust
created by Herman's will is discretionary in nature, such that the beneficiary,
Ruth, may not compel a distribution from its corpus and that therefore, such
corpus is not an available asset for purposes of determining Ruth's eligibility for
Medicaid benefits .. "). Id. at 281, 710 N.W.2d at 646.
187. "[T]he UTC ... abolish[es] the 125-year common law distinction between a discre-
tionary trust and a support trust, so that discretionary trusts must now rely on
spendthrift protection for their asset protection value." Mark Merric, Robert D.
Gillen & Jane Freeman, Malpractice Issues and the Uniform Trust Code, 31 EST.
PLAN. 586, 586 (2004).
188. UTC § 504(b) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(b) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (emphasis
added).
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that a beneficiary could have compelled distributions from a trustee who had
inappropriately withheld distributions. 189
While UTC section 504(b) and Nebraska UTC section 30-3849(b) deny
a creditor the right to compel any distribution that is subject to the
trustee's discretion, UTC section 504(d) and Nebraska UTC section
30-3849(d) make it clear that UTC section 504 and Nebraska UTC sec-
tion 30-3849 "[do] not limit the right of the beneficiary to maintain a
judicial proceeding against a trustee for an abuse of discretion or fail-
ure to comply with a standard for distribution."190 In other words,
UTC section 504 and Nebraska UTC section 30-3849 do not permit
creditors to step into the shoes of beneficiaries of discretionary trusts.
2. The exceptions to protection from creditors recognized by UTC
section 504(c) are too generous. 19 1 Again, this argument does not
withstand a careful reading of the statute. The exceptions apply only
to creditors who are children,1 9 2 spouses or former spouses of a benefi-
ciary. 193 Further, these creditors must be claiming under a judgment
or court order against the beneficiary.194 These exceptions only apply
if and "[t]o the extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of
distribution or has abused a discretion."19 5 Finally, if a creditor satis-
fies all of these requirements, "the court shall direct the trustee to pay
to the child, spouse or former spouse such amount as is equitable
under the circumstances but not more than the amount the trustee
would have been required to distribute to or for the benefit of the benefi-
ciary had the trustee complied with the standard or not abused the
discretion."'19 6
189. Robert T. Danforth, Article Five of the UTC and the Future of Creditors' Rights in
Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2551, 2576 (2006).
190. UTC § 504(d) (2005); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3849(d) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (emphasis
added).
191. "While exception creditors had no claim against a discretionary trust under com-
mon law, all exception creditors would be allowed to directly attach the assets of
a discretionary trust under the UTC . . . ." Merric & Oshins, How Will Asset
Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be Affected by the UTC?, supra note 4 at 484
(2004).
192. UTC § 504(a) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006) provides
that the term "'child' includes any person for whom an order or judgment for
child support has been entered in this or another State."
193. UTC § 504(c)(1) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006) pro-
vide: "a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judgment or a court
order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance of the beneficiary's
child, spouse, or former spouse ......
194. UTC § 504(c)(1) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(1)(Cum. Supp. 2006).
195. UTC § 504(c)(2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(Cum. Supp. 2006).
196. UTC § 504(c)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(2)(Cum. Supp. 2006) (emphasis
added).
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3. The list of exceptions in UTC Section 504(c) can be expanded too
easily.197 Because those who oppose UTC Section 504 seem to con-
sider the UTC and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts as virtually
identical, 198 they confuse possible judicial expansion of exceptions in
a state without a statute dealing with exceptions with possible legisla-
tive expansion of exceptions in a state with a statute dealing with ex-
ceptions. Although a court in a state without an exceptions statute
might decide to adopt the exceptions in the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, once a state has adopted a statute dealing with such excep-
tions, addition of exceptions will have to come from the legislature. To
argue that a state legislature might add an exception to the UTC "by
simply appending an unnoticed exception as part of any other bill that
passes through the legislature,"199 is not the same thing as saying
that such a stealth expansion is likely. Presumably, the legislative
process in most states is robust enough to avoid such a problem.
B. Special Needs Trusts
The Nebraska UTC does nothing to endanger either third party
funded special needs trusts or special needs trusts funded with prop-
erty of the beneficiary. Although some commentators have argued
that eliminating the distinction between various types of discretionary
trusts could somehow change the extent to which the beneficiary's
creditors could reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust,20 0 such
197. Merric & Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be Affected by
the UTC? , supra note 4 at 484-85 (2004).
198.
The UTC and the Restatement Third [of Trusts] are interrelated.
The comments from the UTC contain over 100 specific references to the
Restatement Third's text, comments, and reporter notes. Additionally,
the comment under section 106 of the UTC implies that the Restatement
Third should be given a preference even over common law when inter-
preting the UTC.
The committee of both the Restatement Third and the UTC worked
hand in hand to draft a few areas of new trust law. While there are
minor differences in the asset protection issues between the two pro-
nouncements, for the most part the two pronouncements read as though
they were written by the same authors. With respect to traditional asset
protection, the Restatement Third is for the most part not a restatement
of trust law at all. Rather, it is a new and untested approach to trust
law. The same is true for Article 5 of the UTC, which appears to be an
abbreviated version of the Restatement Third, sections 50 and 56-60.
Merric & Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts Be Affected by
the UTC?, supra note 4 at 478-79.
199. Id. at 484.
200. See, e.g., Merric & Oshins, UTC May Reduce the Asset Protection of Non-Self-
Settled Trusts, supra note 4; Merric & Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of
Spendthrift Trusts Be Affected by the UTC?, supra note 4; Merric & Stein, A
Threat to All SNTs, supra note 4 (arguing that adoption of the UTC gives "state
and federal agencies ... a greater ability to deny government benefits when fami-
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arguments are not persuasive. We will first examine how the Ne-
braska UTC affects special needs trusts funded by third parties and
then how it affects special needs trusts funded with property of the
beneficiary of the trust.
1. Trusts Funded by Third Parties
As explained in Section II-E, this type of special needs trust has
served both a Medicaid/SSI purpose and an asset protection purpose.
If properly drawn, the interest of the disabled beneficiary in this type
of special needs trust will not be an "available" interest that would
disqualify the beneficiary from receiving Medicaid or SSI benefits.
The beneficiary's interest in the trust will be ignored for Medicaid and
SSI purposes either (1) because the trustee has absolute discretion re-
garding payments to or for the benefit of the disabled beneficiary (thus
giving the beneficiary and the beneficiary's creditors no right to de-
mand payments) or (2) because the trust instrument provides that the
trustee can distribute income or principal only for care not otherwise
provided by or available from the government. Nothing in the Ne-
braska UTC will change these results. Indeed, because it eliminates
the concept of the discretionary support trust, the Nebraska UTC
should prevent a Nebraska court from finding that a beneficiary's in-
terest in such a trust is an "available" asset for purposes of qualifica-
tion for Medicaid or SSI.201
Similarly, nothing in the Nebraska UTC should change the extent
to which special needs trusts protect the interest of the disabled bene-
ficiary from the claims of his or her creditors. The Nebraska UTC con-
tinues recognition of spendthrift protection, so use of spendthrift
language in this type of special needs trust will continue to provide
asset protection. The only exceptions are for claims by the benefici-
ary's children, spouse, or former spouse, or by a person who provided
services for the protection of the beneficiary's interest in the trust. Al-
though these exceptions diminish, to some extent, the asset protection
afforded by spendthrift provisions prior to the Nebraska UTC, the ex-
ceptions will be significant in the context of a special needs trust only
if the disabled beneficiary has children, a spouse, or a former spouse,
and then only if the claimant has a judgment or court order for sup-
port or maintenance.
If the asset protection derived from this type of special needs trust
flows from the fact that the trustee has discretion over whether and
lies have created trusts to supplement the care of their elderly or disabled-un-
less the governing documents contain 'special needs' language").
201. See Bureau of Support in the Dep't of Mental Hygiene and Corr. v. Kreitzer, 243
N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1968) (holding that a beneficiary's interest in a discretionary
support trust providing for the beneficiary's "care, comfort, maintenance and gen-
eral well being" was an "available" asset for Medicaid qualification purposes).
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when to make payments to or on behalf of the disabled beneficiary,
nothing in the Nebraska UTC should change a drafter's ability to pro-
vide such protection. As explained earlier, with the limited exception
for support and maintenance claims of children, the spouse, or the for-
mer spouse of a beneficiary, 20 2 the Nebraska UTC provides that "a
creditor of a beneficiary may not compel a distribution that is subject
to the trustee's discretion, even if: (1) the discretion is expressed in
the form of a standard of distribution; or (2) the trustee has abused
the discretion." 20 3 The limited exception for support and maintenance
claims by children, a spouse, or a former spouse will be significant in
the context of a special needs trust only if the disabled beneficiary has
children, a spouse, or a former spouse, and then only if the claimant
has a judgment or court order for support or maintenance and can
persuade a court that the trustee has either failed to comply with a
standard of distribution or has abused a discretion.
2. Trusts Funded with Property of the Beneficiary
As explained in Section II-E, this type of special needs trust, often
called a self-settled special needs trust, is effective for Medicaid and
SSI purposes only if drafted in accordance with the specific require-
ments of 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(d)(4). As to protection from the ben-
eficiary's creditors, both before and after enactment of the Nebraska
UTC, Nebraska law prohibits a settlor from using a spendthrift trust
to protect the settlor's interests in trusts from claims of the settlor's
creditors. Further, both before and after enactment of the Nebraska
UTC, a settlor's interest in a discretionary trust was not immune from
the claims of the settlor's creditors. The Nebraska UTC simply contin-
ues prior Nebraska law when it provides:
(1) During the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust is sub-
ject to claims of the settlor's creditors.
(2) With respect to an irrevocable trust, a creditor or assignee of the settlor
may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's
benefit. If a trust has more than one settlor, the amount the creditor or as-
signee of a particular settlor may reach may not exceed the settlor's interest in
the portion of the trust attributable to that settlor's contribution.
2 0 4
As currently permitted under federal law, self-settled special needs
trusts are a vehicle to allow a disabled person to enjoy benefits in ex-
cess of those available under Medicaid or SSI without disqualifying
the disabled person from receiving Medicaid or SSI benefits. These
trusts are not, and have never been, asset protection devices. If the
Nebraska Legislature determines that such trusts should enjoy some
measure of asset protection, it would have to pass legislation, perhaps
202. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
203. § 30-3849(b) (emphasis added).
204. § 30-3850.
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similar to legislation in Alaska and Delaware, creating such
protection.
V. A POSTSCRIPT ON IN RE TRUST CREATED BY HANSEN
(Editor's Note: During the publication process for this article, the
Nebraska Supreme Court decided In re Trust Created by Hansen. As
this case addressed discretionary trusts, the authors thought it appro-
priate to include a brief discussion within this article. That discussion
follows below.)
In re Trust Created by Hansen20 5 was decided by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court on August 31, 2007. The opinion relied heavily on the
Pohlmann decision, but it lacked the clarity which Pohlmann gave to
Nebraska's transition to the Nebraska UTC. Hansen was the first Ne-
braska case to invoke the derivative right of a deceased life benefici-
ary's estate to compel a distribution from a discretionary trust.
Unfortunately, the opinion created needless confusion by discussing
distinctions that have no continuing importance under the Nebraska
UTC. The decision rested primarily on general statements of trust
law, and the court did not refer to relevant Nebraska UTC provisions
concerning discretionary trusts.
The Nebraska UTC does not separately classify various forms of
discretionary trusts. While distinctive rules may have pertained to
Nebraska's hybrid "discretionary support trust" prior to enactment of
the Nebraska UTC, the term "support" in connection with trusts to
which the Nebraska UTC applies merely describes the subject of
mandatory payments, the subject of discretionary payments, or the
standard by which discretion is to be exercised.
Under the Nebraska UTC, if the trustee has discretion relating to
distributions, the trust is a discretionary trust. With a limited excep-
tion for certain marital creditors, 20 6 "a creditor of a beneficiary may
not compel a distribution that is subject to a trustee's discretion, even
if: (1) the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribu-
tion; or (2) the trustee has abused the discretion."20 7 Thus, the Ne-
braska UTC distinguishes between the right of a creditor to compel
distribution and the right of a beneficiary to compel a distribution and
expressly recognizes "the right of a beneficiary to maintain a judicial
proceeding against a trustee for an abuse of discretion or failure to
comply with a standard for distribution."20 8 That distinction reflects
a policy determination that "the power to force a distribution due to an
205. 274 Neb. 199, 739 N.W.2d 170. Notably, this opinion was authored by Chief Jus-
tice Heavican who was not a member of the Pohlmann Court.
206. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
207. Id. § 30-3849(b) (emphasis added).
208. Id. § 30-3849(d).
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abuse of discretion or failure to comply with a standard belongs solely
to the beneficiary." 20 9 Hansen involved the right of a beneficiary's es-
tate to compel a distribution and, on the record presented, did not
raise issues involving the rights of third party creditors. In contrast,
Pohlmann involved the assertion of rights of a potential creditor, the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. The Court
could have avoided this confusion by omitting all discussion of the na-
ture of the trust in Hansen and holding only that the county court
erred in determining as a matter of law that the trustee could not pay
expenses of the beneficiary's final illness after the beneficiary's death
without conducting an evidentiary hearing on factual issues relevant
to that determination.2 1o
The trust provisions in Hansen, like those in Pohlmann, Doksan-
sky, and Smith v. Smith, contained both mandatory and discretionary
instructions. The terms of the trust in each case require ("mandate")
the trustee to exercise discretion with respect to specified payments
from the trust property. The terms of the Hansen trust stated:
"[Sihould either of said daughters, by reason of accident or illness re-
quire funds in excess of the net income of the Trust, then the Trustee
shall make such payments from such daughter's division of the princi-
pal as it may deem proper for the benefit of such daughter."2 11 Be-
cause this provision included both mandatory and discretionary
language, the provision would have created a discretionary support
trust under Nebraska law prior to the Nebraska UTC. Under the Ne-
braska UTC, as explained in Pohlmann, such language creates a dis-
cretionary trust. The clarifying amendment of Nebraska UTC § 30-
3851 (a) enacted in 2007 now expressly contains the same rule: "The
term ['mandatory distribution'] does not include a distribution subject
to the exercise of the trustee's discretion even if (1) the discretion is
expressed in the form of a standard of distribution or (2) the terms of
the trust authorizing a distribution couple language of discretion with
language of direction."212
The Court stated that "the county court and both parties are labor-
ing under an incorrect assumption that Hansen created a discretion-
209. Id. § 30-3849; UTC § 504 cmt.
210. See, Hansen, 274 Neb. at 213, 214, 739 N.W.2d at 182.
This court has very recently either reversed or vacated three separate
county court orders for lack of competent evidence when the court failed
to hold an evidentiary hearing on factual issues.... In light of our con-
clusion that the county court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the trustee abused its discretion or had a duty to
make support payments, it is unnecessary for us to reach the remaining
assignments of error.
Id.
211. Id. at 201, 739 N.W.2d at 174.
212. L.B. 124, § 26(a), 100th Legis., 1st Sess. (2007).
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ary support trust, or hybrid trust."2 13 Unfortunately, to correct that
incorrect assumption, the Court seized on language in Pohlmann
drawing an apparent distinction between a "support trust"2 14 and a
"discretionary trust."2 15  The language from the Pohlmann opinion
came, in turn, from a North Dakota decision addressing whether a
beneficiary's interest in a trust was an "available asset" for purposes
of Medicaid. 2 16 The Hansen Court apparently read this language to
mean that a "support trust" could never be a "discretionary trust" and
vice versa. Such a reading is too narrow because the terms of a trust
providing for "support" may establish either "mandatory" or "discre-
tionary" distributions. As noted above, if the trust provides for "dis-
cretionary" distributions, the trust is a discretionary trust for
purposes of the Nebraska UTC. With respect to discretionary trusts,
the Nebraska UTC distinguishes between the rights of a beneficiary
and the rights of creditors to compel distributions. Hansen involved a
beneficiary's claim. Pohlmann involved a creditor's claim.
The Hansen Court's purported distinction between the language
used in the Hansen trust document and the language used in the
Pohlmann trust document does not withstand scrutiny. The Court ar-
gued that the language in the Hansen trust
did not grant the trustee the same breadth of discretion created by the trust in
Pohlmann. That is, Hansen did not provide that the trustee "'may', from time
to time" make determinations of his daughter's needs; rather he provided that
"the Trustee 'shall'" make payments for his daughter's benefit if she should
require funds in excess of the trust's income because of an accident or illness.
This provision is the functional equivalent of a term providing that "the
trustee 'shall pay or apply only so much of the... principal... as is necessary
for the [medical care] ... of a beneficiary.'" 2 1 7
The Court focused on the discretionary language in Pohlmann ("may,
from time to time") and did not acknowledge the use of both
mandatory and discretionary language in the trust provision in
Pohlmann: "[TIhe Trustee shall pay to my spouse ... such portion of
213. Hansen, 274 Neb. at 208, 739 N.W.2d at 178.
214. A support trust essentially provides the trustee 'shall pay or apply only
so much of the income and principal or either as is necessary for the
education or support of a beneficiary.'... A support trust allows a bene-
ficiary to compel distributions of income, principal, or both, for expenses
necessary for the beneficiary's support ....
Id. at 208-209, 739 N.W.2d at 178-79 (quoting Pohlman v. Nebraska Dep't of
Health and Human Serv., 271 Neb. 272, 280, 710 N.W.2d 639, 645 (2006) (quot-
ing Eckes v. Richland County Soc. Serv., 621 N.W.2d 851, 855-56 (N.D. 2001))).
215. "Conversely, a discretionary trust grants the trustee 'uncontrolled discretion over
payment to the beneficiary' and may reference the 'general welfare' of the benefi-
ciary .... [T]he beneficiary of a discretionary trust does not have the ability to
compel distributions from the trust .. " Id. at 209 (quoting Pohlman, 271 Neb.
at 280, 710 N.W.2d at 645 (quoting Eckes, 621 N.W.2d at 855-56)).
216. Eckes v. Richland County Soc. Serv., 621 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 2001).
217. Hansen, 274 Neb. at 209, 739 N.W.2d at 179.
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that principal as it may from time to time, deem appropriate for her
health, education, support or maintenance."218 A comparison of the
complete provisions in Pohlmann and Hansen demonstrates that
there is no meaningful difference between the two provisions, inas-
much as the terms of both trusts include a combination of mandatory
and discretionary language. Both Polhmann and Hansen should be
treated as discretionary trusts under the Nebraska UTC.219
Notwithstanding the foregoing criticism of Hansen, the decision is
important because the Court explicitly adopted the "standard for an
estate's recovery of the beneficiary's last illness expenses from the Re-
statement (Third) of Trusts § 50 (2003), which concerns the enforce-
ment of a beneficiary's interests and specifically deals with postdeath
obligations."22o In so doing, the Court held that the estate of a de-
ceased trust beneficiary can enforce the beneficiary's interests in a
trust "to the same extent that the beneficiary could have enforced his
or her interests immediately before death."22 1 In this context, the
Court properly distinguished Smith v. Smith
because the person attempting to reach the trust was the beneficiary's credi-
tor.... [The creditor] did not show that her claim against the son was sup-
port-related or would support his children if the parents were unable, because
the children were emancipated. Nor were we dealing with a beneficiary's re-
quest for support payments in that action.
2 2 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the enactment of the Nebraska UTC, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, relying heavily on the A.L.I. Restatement of Trusts, had
developed a significant body of case law defining the relationships be-
tween and among a settlor's powers to preclude or limit the claims of
218. Brief of Appellee at 7, Pohlmann v. Nebraska Dep't of Health and Human Ser-
vices, No. A-04-001327 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (case renumbered S-04-1327 follow-
ing transfer from the Court of Appeals to the Nebraska Supreme Court)
(emphasis added).
219. The Court's discussion of Smith v. Smith, as it applies to the nature of the trust,
adds to this problem because it could be read as treating Smith as a "support
trust" case. "In Smith, this court stated that 'support trusts may be reached by
creditors for support-related debts, but that discretionary trusts may not be
reached by creditors for any reason.'" Hansen, 274 Neb. at 211, 739 N.W.2d at
180 (emphasis added). Although the Court immediately refers to the trusts in
Smith as "discretionary support trusts," the quoted language suggests, incor-
rectly, that a "support trust" could never be a "discretionary trust."
220. Hansen, 274 Neb. at 212, 739 N.W.2d at 181. The numerous references to the
currently developing Restatement (Third) of Trusts throughout the Hansen deci-
sion are also significant because of the similarity of the rules and policies re-
flected in the Restatement (Third) and the Nebraska UTC and because of the
extensive reliance of prior Nebraska decisions on prior editions of the Restate-
ment of Trusts.
221. Hansen, 274 Neb. at 200, 739 N.W.2d at 174.
222. Id. at 211, 739 N.W.2d at 180.
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creditors against trust property, a beneficiary's interest in a trust, the
discretionary authority of a trustee, and the rights of the beneficiary's
creditors in and to the beneficiary's interest in the trust. The Ne-
braska UTC codified much of the prior case law. The changes made by
the Nebraska UTC are founded on sound public policy and do not un-
dermine appropriate planning to protect beneficiaries (other than the
settlor) and trust property from claims by creditors. Contrary to the
often shrill voices of the relatively few critics of the UTC, the Ne-
braska UTC does not diminish appropriate protection of trust prop-
erty and beneficiaries from the claims of creditors.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Pohlmann v. Nebraska
Department of Health and Human Services provides assurance that
the Court views the Nebraska UTC as consistent with the great ma-
jority of the prior case law. The Court's analysis in that decision helps
Nebraska attorneys understand how prior Nebraska case law fits into
the conceptual framework and policies of the Nebraska UTC. Subse-
quent to the Court's decision in Pohlmann, the 2007 Nebraska Legis-
lature has further clarified the text and underlying policies of the
statutes.
Read in light of Pohlmann, the term "discretionary trust" as used
in the Nebraska UTC will include trusts formerly known as discre-
tionary support trusts. The term "discretionary trust" will also in-
clude trusts formerly known as support trusts unless, under the terms
of the trust, the beneficiary can compel distributions of income, princi-
pal, or both for expenses necessary for the beneficiary's support. In
that case, the general Nebraska UTC provisions concerning
mandatory distributions will apply. Special needs trusts may con-
tinue to play an important role in planning with respect to govern-
mental benefits. Longstanding judicial rules concerning spendthrift
trusts have been well codified in the Nebraska UTC.
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